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Abstract
Machine learning models trained on data from the outside world can be corrupted by data
poisoning attacks that inject malicious points into the models’ training sets. A common
defense against these attacks is data sanitization: first filter out anomalous training points
before training the model. Can data poisoning attacks break data sanitization defenses? In
this paper, we develop three new attacks that can all bypass a broad range of data sanitization
defenses, including commonly-used anomaly detectors based on nearest neighbors, training
loss, and singular-value decomposition. For example, our attacks successfully increase the
test error on the Enron spam detection dataset from 3% to 24% and on the IMDB sentiment
classification dataset from 12% to 29% by adding just 3% poisoned data. In contrast, many
existing attacks from the literature do not explicitly consider defenses, and we show that
those attacks are ineffective in the presence of the defenses we consider. Our attacks are
based on two ideas: (i) we coordinate our attacks to place poisoned points near one another,
which fools some anomaly detectors, and (ii) we formulate each attack as a constrained
optimization problem, with constraints designed to ensure that the poisoned points evade
detection. While this optimization involves solving an expensive bilevel problem, we explore
and develop three efficient approximations to this problem based on influence functions;
minimax duality; and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Our results underscore
the urgent need to develop more sophisticated and robust defenses against data poisoning
attacks.
Keywords: data poisoning, data sanitization, anomaly detection, security
1. Introduction
In high-stakes settings like autonomous driving (Gu et al., 2017), biometrics (Chen et al.,
2017), and cybersecurity (Rubinstein et al., 2009; Suciu et al., 2018), it is crucial that
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machine learning (ML) systems be secure against attacks by malicious actors. Securing ML
systems is complicated by the fact that they are often trained on data obtained from the
outside world, which makes them especially vulnerable: by attacking this data collection
process, which could be as easy as creating a new user account, adversaries can inject
malicious data into the system and cause it to fail.
These data poisoning attacks are the focus of the present work. We consider attacks
against classifiers, wherein an attacker adds some small fraction of new training points to
degrade the performance of the trained classifier on a test set. Figure 1 illustrates this
setting: a model that might otherwise correctly classify most of the data (Figure 1-Left) can
be made to learn a significantly different decision boundary by an attacker who injects just
a small amount of poisoned data (Figure 1-Middle).
A common defense against data poisoning attacks are data sanitization defenses (Cretu
et al., 2008), which use anomaly detectors to filter out training points that look suspicious
(see, e.g., Hodge and Austin (2004) for a review). Others have developed data sanitization
defenses that are effective against some data poisoning attacks (e.g., Paudice et al. (2018)).
Figure 1-Right illustrates a hypothetical defense: the poisoned data is clearly anomalous,
and by removing it, the defender can learn the correct decision boundary. The success of
data sanitization in this case is not surprising, as many data poisoning attacks are developed
without explicitly considering defenses. Instead, attackers might for instance be given an
attack budget (Mei and Zhu, 2015b) or constrained to add points that belong to the input
domain (e.g., word counts in a document should be integer-valued (Nelson et al., 2008;
Newell et al., 2014)). Indeed, none of the existing data poisoning methods that we tested in
our experiments were able to evade the data sanitization defenses we considered.
Previous work has suggested that attacks optimized for evading data sanitization can
in fact evade some types of defenses (Steinhardt et al., 2017). This observation leads to a
natural question that has yet to be systematically studied: can data poisoning attacks that
are explicitly designed to evade anomaly detection get around data sanitization defenses?
Can defenders who deploy data sanitization still be vulnerable to attack?
In this paper, we answer those questions in the affirmative. Our key contribution is to
develop three new data poisoning attacks that can simultaneously evade a broad range of
data sanitization defenses, including commonly-used anomaly detectors based on nearest
neighbors, training loss, singular-value decomposition, and the distance to class centroids.
Our attacks are also able to deal with integer constraints on the input, which naturally
arise in domains like natural language. For example, our attacks on a linear support vector
machine increase test error on the Enron spam detection dataset from 3% to 24% and on
the IMDB sentiment classification dataset from 12% to 29% by adding just 3% poisoned
data, even in the presence of these data sanitization defenses.
How do our attacks evade data sanitization defenses? Roughly speaking, the defenses
we consider fall into two groups, which we handle separately. The first group of defenses
uses anomaly detectors that are highly sensitive to the presence of just a few points: for
instance, an anomaly detector that throws out points that are far away from their nearest
neighbors will not recognize a particular point as anomalous if it is surrounded by a few
other points, even if that small group of points is far from the rest of the data. Intuitively,
such anomaly detectors tend to ‘overfit’ the training data. The second group of defenses
uses anomaly detectors that are less sensitive; these detectors tend to be highly parametric,
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Figure 1: Left: In the absence of any poisoned data, the defender can often learn model
parameters θˆ that fit the true data Dc well. Here, we show the decision boundary
learned by a linear support vector machine on synthetic data. Middle: However,
the addition of poisoned data Dp can significantly change the learned θˆ, leading
to high test error L(θˆ). Right: By discarding outliers from D = Dc ∪ Dp and
then training on the remaining Dsan, the defender can mitigate the effectiveness
of the attacker. In this example, the defender discards all blue points outside the
blue ellipse, and all red points outside the red ellipse.
and tend to ‘underfit’ the training data. For example, consider an anomaly detector that
throws away all points beyond a certain distance from the centroid of the data; whether
this detector considers a given point as anomalous or not does not depend too much on the
addition or removal of a few points from the data, as long as the data centroid does not
change significantly.
To evade the first group of defenses, our attacks concentrate poisoned points in just a
few distinct locations. These attacks tend to look normal to anomaly detectors that are
more sensitive. For example, poisoned data that is placed in a tight cluster will evade the
nearest-neighbor-based anomaly detector that throws out points far away from other points.
The second group of defenses is more resistant to concentrated attacks, since these
defenses are less sensitive to small changes in the data (in this paper, we consider only
attacks that inject 3% or less poisoned data, since in reality attackers might only have control
over a small fraction of the training data). To evade this group of defenses, we formulate the
data poisoning attack as a constrained optimization problem, where the attacker’s objective
is to maximize the test loss of the model that the defender learns on the union of the clean
and poisoned data; the optimization variables are the locations of the poisoned points; and
the constraints are imposed by the defenses (such that a point that satisfies the constraints
will be guaranteed to evade the defenses).
Unfortunately for the attacker, this optimization problem is intractable to solve exactly
(Bard, 1991), and even local methods like gradient ascent are slow (Biggio et al., 2012;
Mei and Zhu, 2015b; Koh and Liang, 2017). To overcome this computational hurdle, we
introduce two ideas:
1. We show theoretically that we can concentrate all of the attack mass on just a few
distinct points (e.g., only 2 points for 2-class support vector machines (SVMs) and
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logistic regression models) and still obtain an attack that is as effective as more diffuse
attacks. This is more efficient as we have fewer optimization variables: we only need
to optimize over the location of a few poisoned points instead of optimizing over all
the points. This leads to what we call the influence attack (Section 4).
2. The difficulty in solving the above optimization problem is that the effect of the
optimization variables (poisoned points) on the objective (test loss) is mediated by
the model parameters that the defender learns on the poisoned data, an intermediate
quantity that is expensive to compute. Instead, we propose a method for efficiently
finding decoy parameters—model parameters that have high test error but low training
error—and show that given fixed decoy parameters, we can efficiently find poisoned
points such that training on these poisoned points yield those decoy parameters.
We call this the KKT attack (Section 5), after the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality
conditions that we use to derive this attack. These decoy parameters also allow us to
improve upon the attack introduced by Steinhardt et al. (2017), which leads to our
min-max attack (Section 6).
Finally, our study reveals several surprising facts about data poisoning:
1. Poisoned data does not have to look anomalous; if the poisoned points are carefully
coordinated, each poisoned point can appear normal, as in the above example of the
nearest-neighbor based anomaly detector.
2. Poisoned points need not have high loss under the poisoned model, and so the defender
cannot simply throw out data points that have high loss. For example, given fixed
decoy parameters, we can constrain our poisoned data to have low loss under the decoy
parameters.
3. Regularization reduces the effect that any single data point can have on the model, and
is therefore tempting to use as a defense against data poisoning. However, increasing
regularization can actually make the defender more susceptible to attacks, because the
defender becomes less able to fit the small fraction of poisoned points.
The success of our data poisoning attacks against common anomaly-based data san-
itization defenses suggest that more work needs to be done on defending against data
poisoning attacks. In particular, while anomaly detectors are typically well-suited to detect
independently-generated anomalous points (e.g., due to some noise process in nature), a
robust defense against data poisoning attacks will have to account for the ability of the
attacker to place all of their poisoned data points in a coordinated fashion.
Beyond the merits of our specific attacks, we believe that our results underscore a broader
and more important point: data poisoning attacks need to account for defenses, and defenses
against such attacks correspondingly need to account for attacks that are specifically targeted
against them. Attacks that do not consider defenses might work against a naive defender but
be easily defeated by basic defenses. Similarly, defenses that are only tested against basic
attacks might give a false sense of security, as they might be broken by more determined
and coordinated attackers.
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2. Problem Setting and Defenses
2.1 General setting
We consider classification tasks in this paper. For simplicity, we focus on binary tasks,
though the ideas here generalize to multi-class tasks. In binary classification, the goal
is to learn a mapping fθ : X → {−1,+1}, parametrized by θ, that maps from features
x ∈ X to an output y ∈ {−1,+1}. We further assume that fθ is a linear classifier, i.e.,
fθ(x) = sign(θ
>x). A mapping fθ is evaluated by its 0-1 test error L0-1(θ;Dtest) on some
fixed test set Dtest = {(xi, yi)}ntesti=1 , which is the proportion of points in Dtest that it classifies
wrongly:
L0-1(θ;Dtest) = 1|Dtest|
∑
(x,y)∈Dtest
I[fθ(x) 6= y]. (1)
We model data poisoning as a zero-sum game between a defender, who wants to pick a
θˆ with low test error L0-1(θˆ;Dtest), and an attacker, which wants to mislead the defender
into picking a θˆ with high L0-1(θˆ;Dtest). The attacker observes the test set Dtest as well as a
clean training set Dc = {(xi, yi)}ni=1, and chooses n poisoned points Dp to add to Dc. The
defender observes the combined training set D = Dc ∪ Dp consisting of the original n clean
points and the n additional poisoned points; uses a data sanitization defense to remove
anomalous points; and then learns θˆ from the remaining data.
Attacker:
• Input: Clean training data Dc and test data Dtest.
• Output: Poisoned training data Dp, with |Dp| = |Dc|.
• Goal: Mislead defender into learning parameters θˆ with high test error L0-1(θˆ;Dtest).
Defender:
• Input: Combined training data D = Dc ∪ Dp.
• Output: Model parameters θˆ.
• Goal: Learn model parameters θˆ with low test error L0-1(θˆ;Dtest) by filtering out
poisoned points Dp.
In our setting, the attacker has several advantages: it knows the test set in advance
(whereas the defender does not); it knows the defender’s training procedure; and it also gets
to observe the clean training set Dc. In reality, the attacker might not have access to all of
this information. However, as defenders, we want to be robust even to attackers that might
have the above information (this is also known as the principle of security by design; see,
e.g., Biggio et al. (2014)). For example, an attacker whose goal is to make the defender get
a particular set of predictions wrong (e.g., the attacker might want to cause a “fake news”
classifier to classify all websites from a certain domain as “real news”) would accordingly
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choose, and therefore get to observe, Dtest. In contrast, the defender might not know the
attacker’s goal in advance, and therefore would not have access to Dtest.
Our experiments in this paper consider the case where the test data Dtest is drawn from
the same distribution as Dc. This is known as an indiscriminate attack (Barreno et al.,
2010), wherein the attacker tries to increase the average test error of the defender’s model
under the normal data distribution. Most of our methods are applicable to more general
choices of Dtest; we discuss this further in Section 8.
2.2 Data sanitization defenses
To thwart the attacker, we assume the defender employs a data sanitization defense (Cretu
et al., 2008), which first removes anomalous-looking points from D = Dc ∪ Dp and then
trains on the remaining points. Why might a defender want to remove anomalies from the
data before training? As a defender thinking from the attacker’s perspective, the intuition
is that poisoned data that looks similar to the clean data will not be effective in changing
the learned model; therefore, the attacker would want to place poisoned points that are
somehow different from the clean data. By discarding points that look too different, the
defender can therefore protect itself against attack.
Different defenses differ in how they judge points as being anomalous: for example, in
what we call the L2 defense, the defender first finds the centroids of each class in D, and
then discards points in D that are far from their respective class centroids. To formalize
this, we represent each defense by a score function sβ : X × Y → R that takes in a data
point (x, y) and returns a number representing how anomalous that data point is. This
score function is parametrized by anomaly detector parameters β that are derived from the
combination of the clean and poisoned training data D = Dc ∪ Dp. In the L2 defense, we
would have β = (µ+, µ−) represent the class centroids and sβ(x, y) = ‖x− βy‖2 measure the
distance of x to the centroid of class y.
Concretely, the defender:
1. Fits the anomaly detector parameters β = B(D), where B is a function (specific to a
particular defense) that takes in a dataset and returns a vector.
2. Constructs the feasible set Fβ = {(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ X × Y with sβ(x, y) < τy}. We
assume that the threshold τy is chosen such that a desired fraction of points from each
class are discarded (e.g., the defender might choose to discard the most 5% of the
training points from each class).
3. Forms the sanitized training dataset Dsan = D ∩ Fβ by discarding all points that fall
outside the feasible set.
4. Finds the θˆ that minimizes the regularized training loss on Dsan:
θˆ = argmin
θ
L(θ;Dsan) def= argmin
θ
λ
2
‖θ‖22 +
1
|Dsan|
∑
(x,y)∈Dsan
`(θ;x, y), (2)
where λ is a hyperparameter controlling regularization strength and ` is a convex
surrogate for the 0/1-loss that fθ incurs. In this paper, we mainly consider support
vector machines (SVMs), which use the hinge loss `(θ;x, y) = max(0, 1− yθ>x).
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Ideally—as in the hypothetical scenario in Figure 1—a defense would filter out the
poisoned data Dp and leave Dsan close to the clean data Dc, so that the defender learns
model parameters θˆ that have low test error.
As stated in Section 2.1, the attacker’s goal is to pick poisoned points that mislead the
defender into choosing model parameters that incur high test error. Against a defender that
employs the data sanitization defense described above, we can formulate the attacker’s goal
as the following optimization problem:
maximize
Dp
L0-1(θˆ;Dtest) (3)
s.t. |Dp| = |Dc|, ( fraction of poisoned points)
where β = B(Dc ∪ Dp) (Fβ is fit on clean and poisoned data)
θˆ
def
= argmin
θ
L (θ; (Dc ∪ Dp) ∩ Fβ) . (defender trains on remaining data)
The first constraint corresponds to the attacker only being able to add in an  fraction
of poisoned points; the second constraint corresponds to the defender fitting the anomaly
detector on the entire training set Dc∪Dp; and the final equality corresponds to the defender
learning model parameters θˆ that minimize training loss.
In this work, we consider 5 different data sanitization defenses, chosen to span a broad
range of approaches to data sanitization and anomaly detection. Each defense is parametrized
by different score functions sβ and anomaly detector parameters β = B(D):
• The L2 defense removes points that are far from their class centroids in L2 distance:
βy = ED[x|y]
sβ(x, y) = ‖x− βy‖2
• The slab defense (Steinhardt et al., 2017) first projects points onto the line between
the class centroids, and then removes points that are too far from the class centroids:
βy = ED[x|y]
sβ(x, y) =
∣∣∣(β1 − β−1)>(x− βy)∣∣∣
The idea behind this defense is that we only want to look at the relevant dimensions
in feature space to find outliers. The L2 defense treats all dimensions equally, whereas
the slab defense treats the vector between the class centroids as the only relevant
dimension.
• The loss defense discards points that are not well fit by a model trained (without any
data sanitization) on the full dataset D:
β = argmin
θ
ED[`θ(x, y)]
sβ(x, y) = `β(x, y)
For a linear model, this is conceptually similar to the slab defense, except that the
relevant feature dimension is learned using the loss function instead of being fixed as
the direction between the class centroids.
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• The SVD defense assumes that the clean data lies in some low-rank subspace, and that
poisoned data therefore will have a large component out of this subspace (Rubinstein
et al., 2009). Let X be the data matrix, with the i-th row containing xi, the features
of the i-th training point. Then:
β = Matrix of top k right singular vectors of X
sβ(x, y) = ‖(I − ββ>)x‖2
In our experiments, we choose the smallest k such that the normalized Frobenius
approximation error (i.e., the normalized sum of the squared singular values) is 0.05.
• The k-NN defense removes points that are far from their k nearest neighbors.
β = Dc ∪ Dp
sβ(x, y) = Distance to k-th nearest neighbor in β
In our experiments, we set k = 5.
Note that β is sometimes a simple set of summary statistics of the dataset (e.g., in the
L2 and slab defenses), while at other times β can be the entire dataset (e.g., in the k-NN
defense). We will handle these two types of defenses separately, as we discuss in Section 3.
Automated defenses. We are interested in settings where the volume of data is too large
for humans to manually inspect. We therefore consider automated defense systems that
rely on the above statistical rules for anomaly detection. Note that this means that a valid
poisoned point, under our framework, could still look anomalous to a human expert (e.g.,
a poisoned point with a bag-of-words feature representation might not correspond to any
grammatical sentence), though it will obey basic input constraints (e.g., having an integer
number of words).
Attack evaluation. The attacker’s goal is to increase test error regardless of which defense
is deployed against it. To evaluate an attack, we run each of the above defenses separately
against it. For an attack Dp to be considered successful, it needs to significantly increase
test error against all of the defenses.
Attack budget and defense threshold. We assume that the attacker has limited control
over the training data: in our experiments, we allow the attacker to only add up to  = 3%
poisoned data, and we set τ to remove p = 5% of the training data from each class.
2.3 Datasets and input constraints
In our experiments, we use 4 datasets for our binary classification tests: the MNIST-1-7
(LeCun et al., 1998) and Dogfish (Koh and Liang, 2017) image datasets, and the Enron
spam detection (Metsis et al., 2006) and IMDB sentiment classification datasets (Maas et al.,
2011). These are the 4 datasets considered in Steinhardt et al. (2017), which also studied
data poisoning. Summaries of each dataset are given in Table 1, including the number of
training points n, the dimension of each point d, and the base accuracy of an SVM trained
only on the clean data. Each dataset has its own characteristics and input constraints:
8
Stronger Data Poisoning
Dataset Classes n ntest d Base Error Input Constraints
MNIST-1-7 2 13007 2163 784 0.7% (λ = 0.01) [0, 1]
Dogfish 2 1800 600 2048 1.3% (λ = 1.10) R
Enron 2 4137 1035 5116 2.9% (λ = 0.09) Z≥0
IMDB 2 25000 25000 89527 11.9% (λ = 0.01) Z≥0
MNIST 10 60000 10000 784 7.5%1 [0, 1]
Table 1: Characteristics of the datasets we consider, together with the base test errors that
an SVM achieves on them (with regularization parameters λ selected by validation).
The input covariates for Enron and IMDB must be non-negative integers.
• The MNIST-1-7 image dataset (LeCun et al., 1998) requires each input feature to
lie within the interval [0, 1] (representing normalized pixels). It is derived from the
standard 10-class MNIST dataset by taking just the images labeled ‘1’ or ‘7’. It is
easily linearly separable: an SVM achieves 0.7% error on the clean data.
• The Dogfish image dataset (Koh and Liang, 2017) has no input constraints; its features
are neural network representations, which for the purposes of this paper we allow to
take any value in Rd. Compared to the MNIST-1-7 dataset (where n d), the Dogfish
dataset has n ≈ d, allowing attackers to potentially exploit overfitting. The Dogfish
dataset also has a low base error of 1.3%.
• The Enron spam classification text dataset (Metsis et al., 2006) requires input to be
non-negative and integer valued, as each feature represents word frequency. As with
the Dogfish dataset, the Enron dataset has n ≈ d and a relatively low base error of
3.0%.
• The IMDB sentiment classification text dataset (Maas et al., 2011) similarly requires
input to be non-negative and integer valued. Compared to the other datasets, the
IMDB dataset has significantly larger n and d, presenting computational challenges.
It also has n d and is not as linearly separable as the other datasets, with a high
base error of 11.9%.
We also use the standard 10-class MNIST dataset (LeCun et al., 1998) for multi-class
experiments, which we discuss in Section 6.
Input constraints. The feasible set Fβ encodes both the defenses and the input constraints
of the dataset, since Fβ ⊆ X × Y and the input domain X only includes valid points. Thus,
the defender will eliminate all input points that do not obey the input constraints of the
dataset.
1. We use the multi-class SVM formulation in Crammer and Singer (2002) to classify the 10-class MNIST
dataset, with no explicit regularization. For computational reasons, we use AdaGrad (Duchi et al., 2010)
to optimize the parameters for the multi-class problem, which provides implicit regularization.
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3. Attack Framework
In this paper, we take on the role of the attacker. Recall that we are given a set of n clean
training points Dc and a test set Dtest, and our goal is to come up with a set of n poisoned
training points Dp such that a defender following the procedure in Section 2.2 will choose
model parameters θˆ that incur high test error L(θˆ). The difficulty lies in choosing poisoned
points Dp that will both lead to high test error and also avoid being flagged as anomalous.
As mentioned in Section 1, we can roughly group anomaly detectors into two categories:
those that are more sensitive to the data and tend to ‘overfit’ (like the k-NN defense), and
those that are less sensitive to the data and tend to ‘underfit’ because they make strong
parametric assumptions (like the L2 defense). This categorization is neither precise nor
rigorous, but it provides useful intuition. As we discuss in this section, we can evade defenses
in the first category by using concentrated attacks, and we can evade defenses in the second
category by using constrained optimization.
Outline. In this section, we will introduce the general ideas that underlie each of the three
data poisoning attacks that we develop in this paper. Specifically, we discuss concentrated
attacks in Section 3.1; formulating data poisoning as a constrained optimization problem in
Section 3.2; and handling integer input constraints in Section 3.3. Subsequently, in Sections 4
to 6, we will detail three specific methods—corresponding to the three different attacks—for
efficiently solving the optimization problem described in this section.
3.1 Concentrated attacks
To bypass anomaly detectors that are sensitive to small changes in the data, we observe
that poisoned data that is concentrated on a few locations tends to appear normal. This is a
simple observation, but to be the best of our knowledge has yet to be exploited for data
poisoning. For example:
• For the k-NN defense and other similar nonparametric anomaly detectors, this is
trivially true: if several poisoned points are placed very near each other, then by
definition, the distances to their nearest neighbors will be small.
• For the SVD defense, it is more likely that the low-rank representation of D will
include the poisoned points, reducing their out-of-projection components.
• For the loss defense, if the poisoned points are concentrated in a similar location, the
model will have more incentive to fit those points (because fitting one of them would
imply fitting all of them, which would reduce the training loss more than fitting a
single isolated point).
In general, anomaly detectors flag points that do not look like other points in the training
data, and can therefore be fooled by sufficiently concentrated groups of poisoned points
(because each poisoned point in each group lies close to other poisoned points). For example,
an attacker could evade the k-NN defense by placing tightly-clustered groups of poisoned
points of size at least k.
However, from the attacker’s point of view, one potential issue is that being constrained
to place points in concentrated groups might hurt the attacker’s ability to change the learned
10
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model, as measured by the number of poisoned points required to make the defender learn
some target parameters. For example, it might be the case that an efficient attack would
involve spreading out each poisoned point throughout the feasible set; and thus if the attacker
were to be forced to group these points together, the resulting attack might be less effective
at changing the defender’s model.
Our theoretical contribution is to show that if the feasible sets for each class are convex,
and if the defender is using a 2-class SVMs or logistic regression model, then—fortunately
for the attacker—the above scenario will not occur. In particular, in that setting, we would
only need two distinct points (one per class) to realize any attack:
Theorem 1 (2 points suffice for 2-class SVMs and logistic regression) Consider a
defender that learns a 2-class SVM or logistic regression model by first discarding all points
outside a fixed feasible set F , and then finding the parameters that minimize the aver-
age (regularized) training loss. Suppose that for each class y = −1,+1, the feasible set
Fy def= {x : (x, y) ∈ F} is a convex set. If a parameter θˆ is attainable by any set of n˜ poisoned
points Dp = {(x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜n˜, y˜n˜)} ⊆ F , then there exists a set of at most n˜ poisoned points
D˜p (possibly with fractional copies) that also attains θˆ but only contains 2 distinct points,
one from each class.
More generally, the above statement is true for any margin-based model with loss of
the form `(θ;x, y) = c(−yθ>x), where c : R → R is a convex, monotone increasing, and
twice-differentiable function, and the ratio of second to first derivatives c′′/c′ is monotone
non-increasing.
Remark 2 If we, as the attacker, concentrate all of the poisoned points in only two distinct
locations, we will trivially evade the k-NN defense. The remaining defenses—L2, slab,
loss, and SVD—all have convex feasible sets, so the conditions of the theorem hold. One
technicality is that in reality, the feasible set will not remain fixed as the theorem assumes:
if an attack Dp is collapsed into a different attack D˜p with at most 2 distinct points, the
feasible set Fβ will also change. However, as discussed at the beginning of this section, it
will tend to change in a way that makes the poisoned points feasible, so if the original attack
Dp was already feasible, the new attack D˜p will likely also be feasible.
We defer the full proof to Appendix A. As a short proof sketch, the proof consists of two
parts: we first relate the number of distinct points necessary to achieve an attack to the
geometry of the set of feasible gradients (i.e., the set of gradients of points within the
feasible set), using the notion of Carathe´odory numbers from convex geometry. We then
show, for the specific losses considered above (the hinge and logistic loss), that this set of
feasible gradients has the necessary geometry. Our method is general and can be extended
to different loss functions and feasible sets; we provide one such extension, to a multi-class
SVM setting, in Appendix A.
The idea that concentrated points can evade anomaly detectors is separate from the idea
that only two distinct points are needed to realize any given attack. To summarize:
1. Concentrated attacks tend to evade anomaly detectors that are more sensitive to
changes in the data, including the k-NN, SVD, and loss defenses.
11
Koh, Steinhardt, and Liang
2. By Theorem 1, concentrating an attack does not diminish its efficiency (as measured
by the number of poisoned points needed to make the defender achieve some target
parameters θˆ).
In Section 4, we show empirically that such concentrated attacks can indeed be effective at
poisoning a defender’s model while evading the k-NN, SVD, and loss defenses.
One objection to attacks with only two distinct poisoned points is that they can be
easily defeated by a defender that throws out repeated points. However, the attacker can
add a small amount of random noise to fuzz up poisoned points without sacrificing the
concentrated nature of the attack. Randomized rounding, which we use to handle datasets
with integer input constraints in Section 3.3, is a version of this procedure.
3.2 Constrained optimization
Anomaly detectors that are more robust to small changes in the training data, such as those
that rely on simple sufficient statistics of the data, tend to be less vulnerable to concentrated
attacks. In our setting, the L2 and slab defenses in particular are not fooled by concentrated
attacks: the class centroid, which is used in both defenses, cannot be moved too much by an
 fraction of poisoned points if  is small and the clean training data Dc well-clustered. (The
class centroid cannot be arbitrarily changed by a single poisoned point that is sufficiently
far away, as such a point would be filtered out by the L2 defense.)
To handle the L2 and slab defenses, we formulate the attacker’s goal as an iterative
constrained optimization problem. At a high level, at each iteration, we update the feasible
set Fβ based on the current poisoned data Dp, and then optimize for a new set of poisoned
data D′p within this feasible set that maximizes test loss while still evading detection. Because
these two defenses are relatively stable to small changes in the data, the feasible set Fβ does
not change too much from iteration to iteration, which makes this iterative optimization
feasible.
We start with the optimization problem (3) from Section 2.2, which we reproduce here
for convenience:
maximize
Dp
L0-1(θˆ;Dtest)
s.t. |Dp| = |Dc|
β = B(Dc ∪ Dp),
where θˆ
def
= argmin
θ
L (θ; (Dc ∪ Dp) ∩ Fβ) .
To make this problem more tractable, we make two approximations. First, we assume that
the defender does not discard any clean points. Thus, if all poisoned points are constrained
to lie within the feasible set Fβ and therefore evade sanitization, then the defender trains on
the entirety of D = Dc ∪ Dp.2 Second, we replace the 0-1 test error L0-1(θˆ;Dtest) with its
convex surrogate L(θˆ;Dtest) def= EDtest`(θˆ;x, y), which is continuous and easier to optimize.
2. This favors the defender, since we do not consider the case in which a savvy attacker might place poisoned
points in such a way as to cause the defender to throw out particularly good points in Dc and therefore
learn a bad model.
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These approximations let us rewrite the above optimization problem as the following:
maximize
Dp
L(θˆ;Dtest) (4)
s.t. |Dp| = |Dc|
Dp ⊆ Fβ
β = B(Dc ∪ Dp),
where θˆ
def
= argmin
θ
L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp).
This problem is still difficult to solve directly; one issue is that the feasible set Fβ depends
on the poisoned data Dp. However, because the feasible sets of the L2 and slab defenses
depend on the class centroids, which are stable with respect to small changes in the poisoned
data Dp, we can alternate between optimizing over Dp for a fixed β, and then updating β to
reflect the new Dp (Algorithm 1). This iterative optimization procedure is guaranteed to
make progress so long as the poisoned points Dp remain valid even after re-fitting β.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for attack via constrained optimization.
Input: clean data Dc, poisoned fraction .
Initialize anomaly detector on clean data: β ← B(Dc)
repeat
Dp ← argmax
|Dp|=|Dc|
Dp⊆Fβ
L(θˆ;Dtest) (Solve (4) with fixed β; see Sections 4-6)
β ← B(Dp) (Update anomaly detector β with new Dp)
until Dp converges
Output Dp.
The stability of the L2 and slab defenses makes this problem easier to optimize, because
it implies that β does not change too much between iterations. In practice, these defenses are
so stable to small sets of poisoned data Dp that we can even skip the iterative optimization.
Instead, we fix the anomaly detector β = B(Dc) on the clean data and solve (4) once. This
non-iterative formulation still yields effective attacks, though the iterative optimization does
make the attacks slightly better (Section 4). This non-iterative constrained optimization
formulation has been used in prior work (e.g., Steinhardt et al. (2017)); our main contribution
in this regard is developing more effective and computationally efficient ways of solving the
optimization problem (Sections 4 to 6).
3.3 Handling integer input constraints with randomized rounding
Each of the three data poisoning attacks that we will subsequently develop use some form
of gradient descent on the poisoned points to solve (4) (the first step in Algorithm 1).
However, gradient descent cannot be directly applied in settings where the input features are
constrained to be non-negative integers (e.g., with bag-of-word models in natural language
tasks). To handle this, we propose a linear programming (LP) relaxation specifically designed
to keep the poisoned points from being detected.
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Our general approach is similar to how Steinhardt et al. (2017) handle integer-valued
input: we relax the integrality constraint to allow non-negative real-valued points, and then
perform randomized rounding on these real-valued points to obtain integer-valued points.
More precisely, we:
1. Solve the optimization problem (4) while allowing all poisoned points (x, y) ∈ Dp to
have real-valued x.
2. Then, for each (x, y) ∈ Dp, we construct a rounded xˆ as follows: for each coordinate i,
xˆi = dxie with probability xi − bxic, and xˆi = bxic otherwise. (d·e denotes ceiling and
b·c denotes floor.)
Note that this procedure preserves the mean: E[xˆ] = x. However, randomized rounding can
produce poisoned points that get detected by data sanitization defenses. We introduce two
techniques to avoid this:
Repeated points. In high dimensions, randomized rounding can result in poisoned points
that are far away from each other. This can make the poisoned points vulnerable to being
filtered out by the defender. Instead, as we discuss in Section 3.1, we want the poisoned
points to be concentrated in a few distinct locations. To do so, we adopt a heuristic of
repeating poisoned points r times after rounding (keeping the overall fraction of poisoned
data, , the same). This means that we find n/r poisoned points {x1, x2, . . . , xn/r}, do
randomized rounding to get {xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆn/r}, and then form the multiset Dp by taking
the union of r copies of this set. In practice, we find that setting r = 2 or 3 works well. This
heuristic better concentrates the poisoned points while still preserving their expected mean
E[xˆ].
Linear programming (LP) relaxation for the L2 defense. Randomized rounding
violates the L2 constraint used in the L2 defense. Recall that in the L2 defense, we wish to
play points (x, y) such that ‖x− µy‖2 ≤ τy, where µy is the mean of class y and τy is some
threshold (Section 2.2). The issue is that even if we control the norm of the continuous x by
having ‖x− µy‖2 ≤ τy, we could still have the randomly-rounded xˆ violate this constraint
on expectation: E[‖xˆ− µy‖2] > τy. This is because the L2 norm is convex, so by Jensen’s
inequality, E[‖xˆ− µy‖2] ≥ ‖E[xˆ]− µy‖2 = ‖x− µy‖2.
As a result, the rounded xˆ could still have a high chance of being detected by the L2
defense, even if the continuous x is safe. Steinhardt et al. (2017) deal with this problem
by setting τy conservatively, so that xˆ might avoid detection even if ‖xˆ− µy‖2 > ‖x− µy‖2.
However, the conservative threshold reduces the attacker’s options, resulting in a generally
less effective attack.
To handle the effect of rounding in a principled way, it suffices to control the expected
squared norm E[‖xˆ−µy‖22]: if E[‖xˆ−µy‖22] < τ2y , then by Jensen’s inequality, E[‖xˆ−µy‖2] < τy.
To compute the expected squared norm, we first write
E[‖xˆ− µy‖22] = E[‖xˆ‖22]− 2〈x, µy〉+ ‖µy‖22. (5)
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Note that E[‖xˆ‖22] can in general be substantially larger than ‖x‖22 due to the variance
from rounding. We can compute E[‖xˆ‖22] explicitly as
E[‖xˆ‖22] =
d∑
i=1
xi(dxie+ bxic)− dxiebxic. (6)
While the function f(x)
def
= x(dxe+ bxc)− dxebxc looks complicated, it actually has a nice
form, which we can see by plotting it:
0 1 2 3 4
x
0
1
4
9
16
f(x
)
Figure 2: Plot of E[‖xˆ‖22] = f(x) against x for scalar x.
Intuitively, we expect f(x) to be close to x2. Indeed, as Figure 2 shows, it is a piecewise-
linear function where the k-th piece linearly interpolates between k2 and (k + 1)2, and we
can write it as the maximum over a set of linear equations:
f(x) =
∞
max
k=0
(2k + 1)x− k(k + 1). (7)
Thus, when solving the attacker optimization (equation (4)) for datasets that have
non-negative integer constraints, we replace the standard L2 feasible set Fβ = {(x, y) :
‖x− µy‖2 ≤ τ2 and x ∈ R≥0} with the modified constraint set
FLP = {(x, y) : E[‖xˆ− µy‖22] ≤ τ2y and x ∈ R≥0}. (8)
If we approximate the infinite maximum in (7) by its first K terms, then the corresponding
approximation of FLP can be represented via a linear program. In our experiments, we choose
K adaptively for each coordinate i to be equal to the largest value that xi attains across the
dataset. This formulation allows us to express the L2 norm constraint E[‖xˆ− µy‖22] ≤ τ2y as
a set of linear constraints on the continuous x, allowing us to control the expected L2 norm
of the poisoned points after rounding.
Randomized rounding has some negative impact: it makes attacks less concentrated,
as discussed above, and can also result in a few unlucky poisoned points getting filtered
by other defenses (e.g., by the loss defense if the rounding happens to increase the loss on
the point). Another advantage of the above LP relaxation is that in practice, the linear
constraints tend to lead to nearly-integer x, which further reduces the negative impact of
having to do randomized rounding.
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4. Improved Influence Attack
In the remainder of this paper, we discuss the task of solving the optimization problem
(4) with a fixed β (the first step in Algorithm 1). This problem is a bilevel optimization
problem (so named because the outer maximization involves solving an inner minimization);
such problems are, in general, non-convex and intractable to solve exactly (Bard, 1991,
1999). In this section and in Sections 5 and 6, we discuss three different methods for
efficiently approximating this problem, corresponding to the three different attacks that
we develop. These methods all generate concentrated attacks (Section 3.1) within our
constrained optimization framework (Section 3.2), and are therefore able to evade all five of
the defenses that we consider (Section 2.2).
Recall that the optimization problem (4) involves finding poisoned dataDp that maximizes
the defender’s test loss L(θˆ;Dtest) for a fixed feasible set Fβ (Section 3.2). In this section,
we introduce the influence attack, which solves this task through projected gradient ascent.
At a high level, we can find a local maximum of (4) by iteratively taking gradient
steps on the features of each poisoned point in Dp, projecting each point onto the feasible
set Fβ after each iteration. This type of gradient-based data poisoning attack has been
previously studied in the literature (see, e.g., Biggio et al. (2012) and Mei and Zhu (2015b)
for attacks without the projection step, and Koh and Liang (2017) and Steinhardt et al.
(2017) for attacks with the projection step). Koh and Liang (2017) use influence functions
to compute this gradient; accordingly, we call this projected gradient ascent method the
influence attack. Our method builds upon previous work by incorporating the techniques
mentioned in Section 3—concentrating the attack and using randomized rounding with the
LP relaxation.
4.1 The basic influence attack
First, we review the basic influence attack, borrowing from the presentation in Koh and
Liang (2017). Our goal is to perform gradient ascent on each (x˜, y˜) ∈ Dp to maximize the
test loss L(θˆ;Dtest). To do so, we need to compute the gradient of L(θˆ;Dtest) w.r.t. each
(x˜, y˜). Since the labels y˜ are discrete, we cannot compute gradients on them; we therefore
fix the labels y˜ at the beginning of the algorithm, and only optimize over the covariates x˜.
Computing the gradient. The difficulty in computing the gradient of the test loss
L(θˆ;Dtest) w.r.t. each x˜ in Dp is that L depends on x˜ only through the model parameters
θˆ, which is a complicated function of Dp. To get around this, the influence attack uses a
closed-form estimate of ∂θˆ∂x˜ , which measures how much the model parameters θˆ change with
a small change to x˜. The desired derivative ∂L∂x˜ can then be computed via the chain rule:
∂L
∂x˜ =
∂L
∂θˆ
∂θˆ
∂x˜ .
The quantity ∂L
∂θˆ
is the average gradient of the loss over the test set, which we denote as
gθˆ,Dtest for convenience, and it can be computed straightforwardly as
∂L
∂θˆ
=
1
|Dtest|
∑
(x,y)∈Dtest
∇`(θˆ;x, y) def= gθˆ,Dtest . (9)
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∂θˆ
∂x˜ is more involved. As shown in Section 2.2 of Koh and Liang (2017), this latter derivative
can be computed as
∂θˆ
∂x˜
= −H−1
θˆ
∂2`(θˆ; x˜, y˜)
∂θˆ ∂x˜
, (10)
where Hθˆ is the Hessian of the training loss at θˆ:
Hθˆ
def
= λI +
1
|Dc ∪ Dp|
∑
(x,y)∈Dc∪Dp
∂2`(θˆ;x, y)
∂θˆ2
. (11)
Combining equations (9) to (11), the gradient of the test loss w.r.t. an attack point x˜ is
∂L(θˆ)
∂x˜
= −g>
θˆ,DtestH
−1
θˆ
∂2`(θˆ; x˜, y˜)
∂θˆ ∂x˜
.
Projecting onto the feasible set. To maintain the feasibility of each poisoned point
(x˜, y˜) ∈ Dp, we project them onto the feasible set Fβ by setting it to the feasible point
(x, y˜) ∈ Fβ that is closest in `2 distance to (x˜, y˜). In our setting, the feasible set is given
by the L2 and slab defenses, so Fβ is convex; thus, this projection is well-defined, in the
sense that there is always a unique closest point in Fβ . Finding this projection is a convex
optimization problem that can be solved efficiently by a general-purpose convex solver.
Algorithm. The full algorithm iteratively computes the gradient ∂L∂x˜ for each attack point
(x˜, y˜) ∈ Dp, moves in the direction of the gradient, and then projects back onto the feasible
set Fβ. In Algorithm 2, we give pseudocode for interleaving this gradient computation
and projection into the iterative optimization framework of Section 3.2 by updating the
feasible set Fβ after each iteration. We call our specific implementation, described below,
the influence-basic attack.
Implementation details. We initialize both x˜i and y˜i through random label flips on the
training set, selecting n data points from the clean data Dc uniformly at random, with
replacement, to flip and add to the poisoned data Dp. We only consider data points that
would still lie in Fβ after the label flip.
We take the loss `(θ;x, y) to be the hinge loss max(0, 1− yθ>x). To efficiently compute
∂θˆ
∂x˜ in (10), we follow Koh and Liang (2017) and use a combination of fast Hessian-vector
products (Pearlmutter, 1994) and a conjugate gradient solver (Martens, 2010); see also
Agarwal et al. (2016) and Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. (2017) for other tractable approaches. We
select the step size η by trying a range of options and selecting the best-performing one on
the test set (since, in our setting, the attacker knows the test set in advance).
We cannot do gradient descent directly on datasets where the x˜’s are constrained to
take on integer values, since the x˜’s are not continuous in that case. To handle this,
the influence-basic attack uses the vanilla randomized rounding procedure described in
Section 3.3 (without the repeated points heuristic or linear programming relaxation).
4.2 Improvements to the basic algorithm
The influence-basic attack suffers from several drawbacks. To address these, we introduce
two new improvements to the algorithm.
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Algorithm 2 The influence-basic attack.
Input: clean data set Dc, poisoning fraction , step size η.
Initialize poisoned data set Dp ← {(x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜n, y˜n)}.
Initialize feasible set Fβ ← B(Dc ∪ Dp).
for t = 1, 2, . . . do
Compute model parameters θˆ ← argminθ L (θ; (Dc ∪ Dp) ∩ Fβ).
Pre-compute g>
θˆ,DtestH
−1
θˆ
as in (9) and (11).
for i = 1, . . . , n do
Set x˜0i ← x˜i − ηg>θˆ,DtestH
−1
θˆ
∂2`(θˆ;x˜i,y˜i)
∂θˆ ∂x˜i
. (gradient update)
Set x˜i ← argminx∈Fβ ‖x− x˜0i ‖2. (projection)
end for
Update feasible set Fβ ← B(Dc ∪ Dp).
end for
Output Dp.
Concentrated attacks. The influence-basic attack optimizes over each of the n poi-
soned points separately. This has two problems: it is slow (we have to compute the gradients
∂L
∂x˜ and do the projection step n times each iteration), and the resulting poisoned points
are often quite far from each other (because of differences in initialization), leaving them
vulnerable to being detected as anomalies. We will show this empirically in Section 4.3.
As Theorem 1 (Section 3.1) shows, we can modify the algorithm to instead only consider
copies of two distinct points (x˜+, 1) and (x˜−,−1), one from each class, without any loss in
attack effectiveness. This is computationally more efficient and also results in a stronger
attack. At each iteration, we only need to compute the gradients and do the projection
twice (vs. n times). Moreover, the resulting attack is by construction concentrated on only
two distinct points, helping it evade detection.
In our implementation, we weight these two poisoned points inversely proportional to
the class balance: i.e., if there are P positive and N negative points in Dc, then we place
N
P+N ·  weight on (x˜+, 1) and PP+N ·  weight on (x˜−,−1). This maintains the same class
balance, on average, as the original label flip initialization.
Randomized rounding with the LP relaxation. Recall that using randomized round-
ing to handle integer input constraints has two issues: first, the rounded points can be far
from each other (reducing concentration), and second, the rounded points might violate the
constraints imposed by the L2 defense even when the continuous (unrounded) points do not.
As discussed in Section 3.3, we use our linear programming relaxation and repeated points
heuristic to mitigate these issues.
A final issue is that the hinge loss is piecewise linear, which means that its gradient is zero
or one, and its Hessian zero, almost everywhere. As a result, the gradient of the test loss L
w.r.t. x˜—which involves an inverse-Hessian-gradient-product, as in Algorithm 2—gives a
very poor indication of which directions to perturb x˜, and can easily get stuck. To mitigate
this problem, we follow Koh and Liang (2017) and smooth the hinge loss, replacing it with
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the function `smooth(θ;x, y) = δ log(1 + exp(
1−yθ>x
δ )) for some small δ. The function `smooth
converges to ` as δ → 0, but has derivatives of all orders whenever δ > 0.
Together, these modifications yield our improved attack, which we call the influence
attack.
4.3 Experimental results
We tested our influence attack on the MNIST-1-7 and Dogfish image datasets and the
Enron spam classification dataset (see Section 2.3 for details). We omitted the IMDB
sentiment classification dataset because the influence attack on this dataset was too slow;
in subsequent sections, we will introduce different attack methods that are fast enough to
run on this dataset.
Recall that our goal is to create an attack Dp that can increase test error regardless of
which defense is deployed against it. To evaluate this, we run each defense in Section 2.2
separately against our attacks and measure the effectiveness of an attack by the minimum
increase in test error it achieves over all of the defenses.
Setup. To carry out the influence attack, we alternate between taking gradient steps
and re-fitting the anomaly detector parameters β, as described in Algorithm 2. We took the
feasible set Fβ to be the intersection of the feasible sets under the L2 and slab defenses,
plus any additional input constraints that each dataset imposed, relying on the concentrated
nature of the attack (i.e., only having two distinct continuous attack points) to evade the
loss, SVD, and k-NN defenses. We varied the amount of poisoned data between  = 0.5%
and  = 3%.
For the defender, we used the hinge loss with L2 regularization, fixing the regularization
parameter via cross-validation on the clean data.3 For each defense, we set the threshold τ
such that 5% of data from each class was filtered out.
Results. As shown in Figure 3, the influence attack significantly increases test error on
the Enron dataset: with  = 1% poisoned data, test error increased from 3% to 13%, and
with  = 3% poisoned data, test error increased to 21%. On the Dogfish dataset, the attack
increases test error from 1% to 5% with  = 1% and 8% with  = 3%. The attack is less
successful on the MNIST-1-7 dataset, and does not appreciably affect test error there. These
results are consistent with Steinhardt et al. (2017), which showed that the L2 and slab
defenses are certifiably effective at defending the MNIST-1-7 dataset, and to a lesser extent
the Dogfish dataset, for low values of .
How important is each defense? Figure 3 plots one curve for each defense, representing
the test error that the attacker achieves under that defense. However, our attacks are
constructed to avoid all of the defenses, even though we evaluate them individually against
each defense; this simulates the fact that the attacker might not know which defense will be
deployed ahead of time, and therefore strives to evade all of them. We can therefore ask
how much each defense is contributing to the total effectiveness of the collective defenses. In
our experiments:
3. In practice, the defender does not have access to the clean data, so its regularization parameter will be
chosen based on the full dataset Dc ∪ Dp. However, our framework assumes that the attacker knows the
regularization parameter in advance. This is a potential disadvantage for the defender. In Section 7.1, we
study what happens if the attacker does not know exactly how much regularization the defender will use.
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Figure 3: The influence attack successfully drives test error on the Enron dataset from 3%
to 23% with just  = 3% poisoned data, and on the Dogfish dataset from 1% to
8%, but does not manage to significantly affect the MNIST-1-7 dataset.
• The L2 defense is essential, as it bounds the distance that a poisoned point can be
from the clean points. Without such a bound, the attacker can cause arbitrary changes
to the defender’s model (Biggio et al., 2012).
• The slab defense decreases the test error that the attacker achieves by a few percentage
points across all of the datasets. This is particularly significant for the MNIST-1-7 and
Dogfish datasets, where the overall test error is low; for example, without the slab
defense, the influence attack achieves 4% test error on MNIST-1-7 and 8% test error
on Dogfish with  = 1% poisoned data.
• The loss defense decreases the test error that the attacker achieves on the Enron
dataset by a few percentage points, which we can read directly from Figure 3. This
is because our randomized rounding procedure can sometimes significantly increase
the loss incurred on a poisoned point (e.g., an input feature of 0.01 can sometimes
be rounded up to 1, and if the coefficient for that feature is large, the rounded point
could incur high loss even though the loss of the continuous, unrounded point is low).
• On the other hand, the k-NN and SVD do not contribute much to the defenses; if
we removed them from consideration, our attacks would be just as effective.
To test the effect of our improvements over the influence-basic attack, we ran an
ablative study on the Enron dataset. Comparing our attack (Figure 4-Left) to a version
without the linear programming (LP) relaxation (Figure 4-Mid), we can see that the LP
relaxation increases test error by a few percentage points. The difference is even more stark
when comparing our attack to the influence-basic attack (Figure 4-Right), which does not
include the LP relaxation nor the smoothed hinge or concentrated points, and consequently
does not manage to increase test error beyond 10%.
Iterative optimization. Finally, we investigate the effect of iterative optimization by
comparing the full attack, which iteratively updates the anomaly detector parameters β
(Algorithm 1), with an attack that simply fixes β based on the clean training data at the
start. (For both attacks, the defender still trains its anomaly detector on the entire training
set Dc ∪ Dp.) While iterative optimization does consistently slightly better (Figure 5), the
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Figure 4: Ablative study of the changes we made to the influence attack, evaluated on
the Enron dataset. Left: results of the influence attack. Middle: results of the
influence attack, without the linear programming (LP) relaxation described in
Section 3.3. Right: results of the influence-basic attack, which does not use the
LP relaxation nor the smoothed hinge and concentrated attack.
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Figure 5: Iteratively updating the feasible set Fβ increases test error by a few percentage
points on the Enron dataset (with  = 3% poisoned data), compared to fixing the
feasible set based on just the clean data Dc.
latter attack is still very successful; from this, at the low levels of  that we choose, the
attack does not shift the centroids of the data that much, and therefore the feasible set Fβ
for both the L2 and slab defenses stay somewhat constant.
One perspective on iterative optimization in our setting is that it is targeting the slab
defense by trying to rotate the vector between the two class centroids; as Steinhardt et al.
(2017) show, at large  (e.g.,  = 0.3, which is 10 times larger than what we consider), this
vector can be significantly changed by the poisoned points, whereas the L2 feasible set is
harder to perturb. Thus, the effectiveness of iterative optimization is upper-bounded by
how effective the slab defense is. On the Enron dataset and at the low  settings that we
consider, the slab defense only decreases test error by a few percentage points, so iterative
optimization only increases test loss by a few percentage points. To illustrate this point,
we ran an attack with  = 0.3 on the MNIST-1-7 dataset: the influence attack without
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iterative optimization achieved an increase in test error of only 1.1%, while the influence
attack with iterative optimization achieved a larger increase in test error of 7.5%.
Our conclusion is that iterative optimization only slightly increases the effectiveness of
the attacks in the low  setting that we focus on. For simplicity, in the rest of the paper we
will therefore fix β based on the clean training data at the start of each attack and use a
single instance of constrained optimization.
Comparison with related work. The influence-basic attack is equivalent to the
gradient-based attacks introduced in prior work (e.g., in Biggio et al. (2012), Mei and Zhu
(2015b), and Koh and Liang (2017)), except that we augment the attack by projecting
back onto the feasible set (otherwise, the poisoned points will be trivially detected by the
defenses). These gradient-based attacks appear to be the most popular way of carrying
out indiscriminate data poisoning attacks. Our ablative analysis (Figure 4) shows that the
improvements in the influence attack significantly increase its effectiveness against data
sanitization defenses.
Steinhardt et al. (2017) successfully attack the MNIST-1-7 and Dogfish datasets using
 = 0.3, which is an order of magnitude larger than what we consider here. Their attack uses
a specialized semi-definite programming formulation and relies on poisoning the anomaly
detector (i.e., placing poisoned points to move the class centroids in a way that renders the
slab defense ineffective). At the lower levels of  that we consider in this paper, they showed
that no data poisoning attack can significantly increase test error on those datasets when
both the L2 and slab defenses are used.
Note that our influence attacks on MNIST-1-7 at high  are considerably weaker than
those in Steinhardt et al. (2017), which uses a specialized semi-definite program to achieve
an increase in test error of 39% for  = 0.3. The high- setting is not our focus in this paper,
since it is less realistic; this performance gap could be a result of poor step size tuning or
initialization on our part, or it could signify a weakness in the applicability of iterative
optimization and/or gradient descent to the high- setting.
Discussion. The success of our attacks vary a lot from dataset to dataset. Steinhardt
et al. (2017) speculate that dataset-dependent factors, like the dimensionality of the feature
space and how well-separated the classes are, can significantly affect the ability of our attacks
to poison the learned model.
The influence attack is successful against the Enron dataset, despite the additional
integer constraints that it imposes. However, the drawback of the influence attack is that it
is slow: each iteration of gradient descent requires computing an expensive inverse Hessian-
vector product (10) and a projection onto the feasible set, which can also be expensive in
high dimensions. This restriction makes the attack infeasible to scale to datasets with higher
dimensions. Moreover, the influence attack relies on local optimization and can sometimes
get stuck in poor local minima.
In the next two sections, we will discuss two different attack approaches that mitigate
these issues.
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5. KKT Attack
We propose a new attack, the KKT attack, that addresses two shortcomings of the influence
attack: its computational cost and susceptibility to local minima. The KKT attack is based
on the observation that the difficulty in the attacker’s optimization problem (4) stems from
how the optimization variable Dp only affects the objective (test loss L(θˆ;Dtest)) through
the model parameters θˆ, which are themselves a complicated function of Dp. In general, we
do not know what θˆ would lead to an attack that is both effective and realizable; but if we
did know which θˆ we were after, then the above optimization problem simplifies to finding
Dp such that θˆ = argminθ L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp). As we will show in this section, this simplified
problem can be solved much more efficiently than the original bilevel problem.
The KKT attack makes use of this observation by decomposing the attack into two
parts: 1) using fast heuristics to find decoy parameters θdecoy that we want the defender to
learn, and then 2) finding poisoned data Dp such that the defender is indeed tricked into
learning the decoy parameters θdecoy. The name of this attack comes from the use of the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) first-order necessary conditions for optimality in step 2.
5.1 Attacking with known θdecoy
Assume for now that we have identified decoy parameters θdecoy that we, as the attacker,
would like the defender to learn. Our task is then to find poisoned data Dp such that Dp
evades data sanitization and θdecoy minimizes the overall training loss over both Dp and the
clean data Dc. We can formulate this task as the following optimization problem:
find Dp (12)
s.t. |Dp| = |Dc|
Dp ⊆ Fβ
θdecoy = argmin
θ
L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp).
Since θdecoy is pre-specified, we can rewrite this inner optimization as a simple equality.
Specifically, if the loss ` is strictly convex and differentiable in θ, we can rewrite the condition
θdecoy = argmin
θ
L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp)
= argmin
θ
∑
(x,y)∈Dc
`(θ;x, y) +
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈Dp
`(θ; x˜, y˜)
as the equivalent KKT optimality condition∑
(x,y)∈Dc
∇θ`(θdecoy;x, y) +
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈Dp
∇θ`(θdecoy; x˜, y˜) = 0. (13)
If the loss ` is not differentiable, e.g., the hinge loss, we can replace this with a similar
subgradient condition.
Since the first term in (13) is fixed (i.e., it does not depend on the optimization variable
Dp), we can treat it as a constant gθdecoy,Dc def= 1|Dc|
∑
(x,y)∈Dc ∇θ`(θdecoy;x, y). Rewriting
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(13) as gθdecoy,Dc +
1
|Dc|
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈Dp ∇θ`(θdecoy; x˜, y˜) = 0 and substituting it into (12) gives us
find Dp (14)
s.t. |Dp| = |Dc|
Dp ⊆ Fβ
gθdecoy,Dc +
1
|Dc|
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈Dp
∇θ`(θdecoy; x˜, y˜) = 0.
If this optimization problem (14) has a solution, we can find it by solving the equivalent
norm-minimization problem
minimize
Dp
∥∥gθdecoy,Dc + 1|Dc| ∑
(x˜,y˜)∈Dp
∇θ`(θdecoy; x˜, y˜)
∥∥2
2
(15)
s.t. |Dp| = |Dc|
Dp ⊆ Fβ,
which moves the KKT constraint into the objective, relying on the fact that the norm of a
vector is minimized when the vector is 0.
Concentrated attacks. As with the influence attack, Theorem 1 (Section 3.1) shows
that we can concentrate our attacks by placing all of the poisoned points at two distinct
locations without any loss in attack effectiveness; his makes our attack computationally
faster and more likely to evade data sanitization. If we let + · n and − · n be the number
of positive and negative poisoned points added, respectively, we can write (15) as
minimize
x˜+,x˜−,+,−
∥∥gθdecoy,Dc + +∇θ`(θdecoy; x˜+, 1) + −∇θ`(θdecoy; x˜−,−1)∥∥22 (16)
s.t. + + − = 
(x˜+, 1), (x˜−,−1) ∈ Fβ.
This optimization problem is non-convex, but can be solved by local methods like gradient
descent. Note that unlike the influence attack, this KKT attack does not require any
expensive inverse Hessian calculations. Thus, if we have decoy parameters θdecoy in mind,
we can efficiently generate poisoned data Dp that will make the defender learn parameters
that are close to θdecoy.
Evading the loss defense. Some defenses, like the loss defense in our setting, have
feasible sets that depend on the model parameters θˆ that the defender learns, which in
turn depend on the poisoned points. This dependence makes it difficult for the attacker
to explicitly constrain their poisoned points to lie within such feasible sets: the iterative
optimization procedure in Section 3.2 relies on the feasible set not changing too much
from one iteration to the next, but a successful attack will obtain parameters θˆ that are
significantly different from what they would be on clean data. f Moreover, in the case of the
loss defense, iterative optimization is prone to getting stuck in a local optimum: if, at each
iteration, we restrict the poisoned points to have low loss under the current value of θˆ, then
the poisoned points will not be able to move θˆ by much.
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For the above reasons, we rely on concentrated attacks (Section 3.1) to evade the loss
defense, and we do not optimize explicitly for it in the influence attack. While this approach
is empirically effective, it relies to some extent on luck: the attacker cannot guarantee that
its poisoned points will have low loss, and as we discuss in Section 4.3, the loss defense does
decrease the test error achieved by a couple of percentage points.
In contrast, decoy parameters give attackers a computationally tractable handle on
defenses like the loss defense. With decoy parameters, the attacker can approximately
specify the feasible set Fβ independently of the learned parameters θˆ, since we know that if
the attack works, the learned parameters θˆ should be close to the decoy parameters θdecoy.
For example, we can handle the loss defense by adding the constraint `(θdecoy; x˜, y˜) < τy˜ for
each poisoned point (x˜, y˜) ∈ Dp.
SVMs. In our experiments, the defender uses the hinge loss `(θ;x, y) = max(0, 1− yθ>x)
and applies `2 regularization with regularization parameter λ ((2), Section 2.2). In this
setting, we can write (16) as the following:
minimize
x˜+,x˜−,+,−
∥∥gθdecoy,Dc − +x˜+ + −x˜− + λθdecoy∥∥22 (17)
s.t. 1− θ>x˜+ ≥ 0
1 + θ>x˜+ ≥ 0
+ + − = 
(x˜+, 1), (x˜−,−1) ∈ Fβ,
where the first two constraints ensure that (x˜+, 1) and (x˜−,−1) are both support vectors.
This problem is convex when the feasible set Fβ is convex and + and − are fixed; since Fβ
is convex in our setting, we can grid search over + and − and call a generic solver for the
resulting convex problem. Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 KKT attack with grid search.
Input: clean data set Dc, feasible set Fβ, poisoning fraction , grid search size T .
for t = 0, . . . , T do
Set + ← t/T , − ← − +.
Obtain θˆ, x˜+, and x˜− by solving (17) with fixed values of +, −.
Evaluate test error L(θˆ).
end for
Pick x˜+, x˜−, +, − corresponding to highest test error L(θˆ) found in grid search.
Output Dp = {+|Dc| copies of x˜+ and −|Dc| copies of x˜−}.
5.2 Finding decoy parameters θdecoy
The above section relied on having pre-specified decoy parameters θdecoy. How can we
efficiently find candidate decoy parameters?
Good decoy parameters, from the perspective of the attacker, should have high test error
while still being achievable by some poisoned data Dp. Decoy parameters that have a high
loss on the clean data Dc are unlikely to be achievable by an  fraction of poisoned data Dp,
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since it is likely that there exist other parameters that would have a lower training loss (and
would therefore be learned by the defender).
Algorithm 4 Finding decoy parameters θdecoy
Input: clean data set Dc, loss threshold γ, number of repeats r.
θc ← argminθ L(θ;Dc)
Dflip ← r copies of {(x, y) ∈ Dtest : `(θc;x, y) ≥ γ}
Ddecoy ← Dc ∪ Dflip
θdecoy ← argminθ L(θ;Ddecoy)
Output Ddecoy.
One heuristic for finding such decoy parameters is by augmenting the clean data Dc with
a dataset Dflip comprising label-flipped examples from Dtest, and finding the parameters that
minimize the training loss on this modified training set Ddecoy = Dc ∪ Dflip (Algorithm 4).
The idea is that since the decoy parameters θdecoy were trained on Ddecoy, which incorporates
flipped points from Dtest, it might achieve high test loss. At the same time, the following
informal argument suggests that the decoy parameters θdecoy are likely to have low loss on
the clean data Dc. By construction,
|Dc| · L(θdecoy;Dc) + |Dflip| · L(θdecoy;Dflip) = |Ddecoy| · L(θdecoy;Ddecoy)
≤ |Ddecoy| · L(θc;Ddecoy)
= |Dc| · L(θc;Dc) + |Dflip| · L(θc;Dflip).
Rearranging terms, this implies that
L(θdecoy;Dc) ≤ L(θc;Dc) + |Dflip||Dc| · (L(θc;Dflip)− L(θdecoy;Dflip))
≤ L(θc;Dc) + |Dflip||Dc| · L(θc;Dflip),
where the last inequality comes from the non-negativity of the loss L. The second term
on the right-hand side, L(θc;Dflip), is likely to be small: Dflip comprises of points that
originally had a high loss under θc before their labels were flipped (which implies that their
label-flipped versions are likely to have a lower loss), and we can choose |Dflip| to be small
compared to |Dc|. Thus, the average loss L(θdecoy;Dc) of the decoy parameters θdecoy on the
clean data Dc is not likely to be too much higher than L(θc;Dc), which is the best possible
average loss on Dc within the model family.
By varying the loss threshold γ and number of repeats r used in Algorithm 4, we obtain
different candidates for θdecoy. Since finding an attack Dp for each candidate θdecoy is fast,
our attack algorithm generates a set of candidate decoy parameters and tries all of them,
picking the θdecoy that achieves the highest test loss.
5.3 Experimental results
We tested our KKT attack against the Enron dataset, from before, as well as the larger
IMDB dataset (see Table 1 for dataset details). We focus on these two datasets as they are
more vulnerable to attack (compared to the MNIST-1-7 and Dogfish datasets, which have
some certificates of defensibility; see Section 4 and Steinhardt et al. (2017)).
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Figure 6: The KKT and min-max attacks give slightly higher test error than the influence
attack. (Note there is stochasticity in results due to randomized rounding.)
Moreover, these attacks are efficient enough to run on the IMDB dataset. Here,
we show results with  = 3% poisoned data and without iterative optimization.
Setup. For each dataset, we first generated candidate decoy parameters as in Section 5.2—
adding r copies of each test point whose flipped label has loss greater than γ. For Enron
we swept over r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 25, 33} and γ set to the qth quantile of the loss (over
the flipped test set), for q ∈ {0.05, 0.10, . . . , 0.55}. This yielded 99 candidates θdecoy; for
efficiency we removed all parameters that had lower test error and higher training loss than
some other candidate θ′decoy. This left us with 48 parameters total. For IMDB we applied
a similar procedure but took r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and q ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.6}; this yielded 18
candidates after pruning (we sought fewer candidates for IMDB because it is bigger and
slower to attack).
We set the fraction of poisoned data to be  = 3%, and for each set of decoy parameters,
we grid searched over 7 different ratios of positive vs. negative poisoned points, ranging
from + = 3%, − = 0% to + = 0%, − = 3%. For this attack, we used the intersection of
the feasible sets under the L2, slab, and loss defenses (since it is easy to specify the latter
with decoy parameters), and relied on attack concentration to evade the SVD and k-NN
defenses. We initialized the feasible set parameters β on the clean data Dc and fixed them.
For the defender, as before, we set the threshold for each defense such that 5% of data
from each class was filtered out, and used a `2 regularized hinge loss for training. As always,
the defender trains its anomaly detector on the entire dataset Dc ∪ Dp.
Results. The KKT attack achieves slightly higher test error than the influence attack
on the Enron dataset (22.5% vs. 18.3%, taking the minimum over all defenses, and both
without iterative optimization; Figure 6-Left). The computational efficiency of the KKT
attack also allowed us to run it against the IMDB dataset—which has 6x the data points
and 17x the features of the Enron dataset— achieving a test error of 27.8% (Figure 6-Right).
In our experiments, successful attacks did not need to exactly reach the decoy parameters;
in fact, trying to get to ambitious (i.e., high test error but unattainable) decoy parameters
could sometimes outperform exactly reaching unambitious decoy parameters. (Of course,
the ideal choice of decoy parameters would have high test error but also be attainable.)
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Figure 7: The test error achieved by the different attacks (against the L2 defense), vs. the
number of minutes taken to generate the attacks. Each step increase in test error
represents the processing of one choice of decoy parameters (for the KKT and
min-max attacks) or 10 gradient steps (for the influence attack).
Timing. We measured the speed of the KKT and influence attacks against the Enron
dataset by running them each on 2 cores of an Intel Xeon E5 processor. Additionally, the
influence attack used a GeForce GTX Titan X for GPU-based calculations. Despite not
using a GPU, the KKT attack was significantly faster: to reach 17% error, the KKT attack
took 27 seconds while the influence attack took 286 minutes (Figure 7).
Discussion. The KKT attack is efficient and effective when suitable decoy parameters
can be generated. Its speed, relative to the influence attack, come from two sources: it
avoids expensive inverse Hessian-vector product calculations (10); and since it is solving a
convex problem (as opposed to the non-convex problem that the influence attack is doing
gradient descent on), it admits efficient general-purpose convex optimization solvers.
However, the KKT attack has some drawbacks:
1. The KKT attack relies on the convexity of the optimization problem (17), which
is a stronger condition than generally requiring that the model loss be convex. The
influence attack is more generally applicable.
2. Our current method of generating decoy parameters (Algorithm 4) does not take into
account any defenses, so it could fail at generating good decoy parameters that are
achievable under more sophisticated defenses.
3. Finally, as with the influence attack, our current implementation of the KKT attack
requires grid-searching over the ratio of positive to negative points. This quickly
becomes infeasible in multi-class settings (though gradient descent on the class balance
could still be effective).
Note that in some settings, the goal of the attacker can be to make the defender learn
some particular target parameters, as opposed to our current attacker goal of increasing
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test loss (Mei and Zhu, 2015b). The KKT attack offers a direct way of attacking in such
situations: set θdecoy to the attacker’s target parameters. This can be significantly more
efficient, and less vulnerable to getting stuck in local minima, than the variants of the
influence attack that have been used in previous work (Mei and Zhu, 2015b).
6. Improved Min-Max Attack
Our third and final attack is the min-max attack, which improves on what we call the
min-max-basic attack from prior work. Our min-max attack relies on the same decoy
parameters introduced in Section 5, but unlike the influence and KKT attacks, it naturally
handles multi-class problems and does not require convexity of the feasible set. Its drawback
is assuming that the clean data Dc and the test data Dtest are drawn from the same
distribution (i.e., that the attacker is performing an indiscriminate attack, see Sections 2
and 8).
We start by reviewing the min-max-basic attack, as it was introduced in Steinhardt
et al. (2017).
6.1 The min-max-basic attack
Recall that the attacker’s goal is to find poisoned points Dp that maximize the test loss
L(θˆ;Dtest) that the defender incurs, where the parameters θˆ are chosen to minimize the
training loss L(θˆ;Dc∪Dp) (equation (4)). As we discussed in Sections 3.2, 4, and 5, the bilevel
nature of this optimization problem—maximizing the loss involves an inner minimization to
find the parameters θˆ—makes it difficult to solve.
The key insight in Steinhardt et al. (2017) was that we can make this problem tractable
by replacing the test loss L(θˆ;Dtest) with the training loss L(θˆ;Dc ∪ Dp). This substitution
changes the bilevel problem into a saddle-point problem—i.e., one that can be expressed in
the form minu maxv f(u, v)— that can be solved efficiently via gradient descent.
To do so, we first approximate the average test loss with the average clean training loss:
L(θ;Dtest) ≈ L(θ;Dc). (18)
This approximation only works in the setting where the test data Dtest is drawn from
the same distribution as the (clean) training data Dc, and relies on the training set being
sufficiently big and the model being appropriately regularized, such that test loss is similar
to training loss. Next, we make use of the non-negativity of the loss to upper bound the
average clean training loss with the average combined loss on the clean and poisoned data:
L(θ;Dc) ≤ L(θ;Dc) + L(θ;Dp) = (1 + )L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp), (19)
where, as usual,  is the relative ratio of poisoned points  =
|Dp|
|Dc| .
By combining (18) and (19), we can approximately upper-bound the average test loss
L(θ;Dtest) by (1 + ) times the average loss on the combined training data L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp).
Instead of directly optimizing for L(θ;Dtest) as the attacker (equation (4)), we can therefore
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optimize for L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp), which gives us
maximize
Dp⊆Fβ
L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp)
where θˆ
def
= argmin
θ
L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp).
The advantage of this formulation is that the outer maximization and inner minimization are
over the same function L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp), which lets us rewrite it as the saddle-point problem
max
Dp⊆Fβ
min
θ
L(θˆ;Dc ∪ Dp). (20)
When the loss ` is convex, we can solve (20) by swapping min and max and solving the
resulting problem minθ maxDp⊆Fβ L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp), which expands out to
min
θ
[λ(1 + )
2
‖θ‖22 +
1
|Dc|
∑
(x,y)∈Dc
`(θ;x, y) +  max
(x˜,y˜)∈Fβ
`(θ; x˜, y˜)
]
. (21)
This problem is convex when the loss ` is convex, and we can solve it via (sub-)gradient
descent by iteratively finding (x˜, y˜) ∈ Fβ that maximizes `(θ; x˜, y˜), then taking the gradient
of the outer expression w.r.t. (x˜, y˜).
To solve the inner problem of finding (x˜, y˜) ∈ Fβ that maximizes `(θ; x˜, y˜), we note
that if the model is margin-based, i.e., `(θ; x˜, y˜) = c(−yθ>x) for some monotone increasing
function c (which is the case for SVMs and logistic regression), then maximizing `(θ; x˜, y˜) is
equivalent to minimizing the margin yθ>x. For a fixed y˜, we can solve the convex problem
minimize
x˜
y˜θ>x˜
s.t. (x˜, y˜) ∈ Fβ.
To find the (x˜, y˜) ∈ Fβ that maximizes the loss `(θ; x˜, y˜), we therefore enumerate over the
possible choices of y˜, solving the above convex problem for each y˜, and pick the one that
gives the smallest (most negative) margin.
Steinhardt et al. (2017) show that if (21) is minimized incrementally via n iterations of
gradient descent, then we can form a strong attack Dp out of the corresponding set of n
maximizers {(x˜, y˜)}. Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 5.
This algorithm automatically handles class balance, since at each iteration it chooses
to add either a positive or negative point; it can thus handle multi-class attacks without
additional difficulty, unlike the KKT or influence attacks. Moreover, unlike the influence
attack, it avoids solving the expensive bilevel optimization problem, which makes it fast
enough to run on larger datasets like the IMDB sentiment dataset.
6.2 Improvements to the basic algorithm
In this paper, we improve the min-max-basic attack by incorporating the decoy parameters
introduced in Section 5 (Algorithm 4).
The min-max-basic attack aims to maximize the combined training loss L(θˆ;Dc ∪Dp),
and achieves this by repeatedly adding in the highest-loss point that lies in the feasible
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Algorithm 5 min-max-basic attack.
Input: clean data Dc, poisoned fraction , burn-in nburn, feasible set Fβ.
Initialize: θ ∈ Rd, Dp ← ∅.
for t = 1, . . . , nburn + n do
Pick(x˜, y˜) ∈ argmax(x,y)∈Fβ `(θ;x, y). (Find highest-loss point in Fβ)
θ ← θ − η(λθ +∇L(θ) + ∇`(θ; x˜, y˜)) (Gradient update)
if t > nburn then
Dp ← Dp ∪ {(x˜, y˜)} (Add point to attack set)
end if
end for
Output Dp.
set Fβ. The problem with this approach is that at low , the attack might end up picking
poisoned points Dp that are not fit well by the model, i.e., with high L(θˆ;Dp). These points
could still lead to a high combined loss L(θˆ;Dc∪Dp), but such an attack would be ineffective
for two reasons:
1. The loss on the clean data L(θˆ;Dc) might still be low, implying that the test loss
would also be low. Such a scenario could happen if there is no model that fits both
the poisoned points Dp and the clean points Dc well, since  is small, overall training
loss could then be minimized by fitting Dc well at the expense of Dp.
2. If the poisoned points have high loss compared to the clean points, they are likely to
be filtered by the loss defense.
We therefore want to keep the loss on the poisoned points, L(θˆ;Dp), small. To do so, we
use the decoy parameters θdecoy from Section 5 (Algorithm 4), augmenting the feasible set
Fβ with the constraint
`(θdecoy;x, y) ≤ τ, (22)
for some fixed threshold τ . At each iteration, the attacker thus searches for poisoned points
(x˜, y˜) that maximize loss under the current parameters θ while having low loss under the
decoy parameters θdecoy. This procedure addresses the two issues above:
1. Adding poisoned points with high loss under the current parameters but low loss under
the decoy parameters θdecoy is likely to drive the learned parameters towards θdecoy.
In turn, this will increase the test loss, since θdecoy is chosen to have high test loss
Section 5.2.
2. If the learned parameters are driven towards θdecoy, the poisoned points in Dp will
have low loss due to the constraint (22), and hence will not get filtered by the loss
defense.
We find that empirically, the min-max-basic attack naturally yields attacks that are
quite concentrated. For datasets with integer input constraints, we additionally use the
linear programming relaxation and repeated points heuristic (Section 3.3). Altogether, these
changes to the min-max-basic attack yield what we call the min-max attack.
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Figure 8: The use of decoy parameters allows the min-max attack to evade the loss defense.
6.3 Experimental results
Setup. To test the min-max attack, we followed the same experimental setup as the
KKT attack (Section 5): using the Enron and IMDB datasets, running without alternating
optimization, and with the same set of decoy parameters. To evade the loss defense, we used
the threshold τ = 0.25 across all experiments. The results were fairly robust to this choice
of threshold.
Results. The min-max attack successfully poisoned the Enron and IMDB datasets,
achieving test errors of 23.7% and 29.2% respectively (Figure 6). This is comparable to the
effectiveness of the KKT attack, and slightly better than the influence attack. In terms
of computational efficiency, the min-max attack took 28 minutes to process its first decoy
parameter, which gave 23.0% error; this is slower than the KKT attack, but significantly
faster than the influence attack Figure 7.
To measure the effect of using decoy parameters in the min-max attack, we ran the min-
max-basic attack from Steinhardt et al. (2017), augmented with the linear programming
relaxation and repeated points heuristic. (The unaugmented version of the min-max-basic
attack from Steinhardt et al. (2017) performs worse.) In contrast to the min-max attack,
the min-max-basic attack gets defeated by the loss defense (test error 10.0%, Figure 8);
without the constraints imposed by the decoy parameters, the poisoned points found by the
min-max-basic attack have high loss, as discussed in Section 6.2.
Multi-class. One advantage of the min-max attack is that it works even when the input
domain X × Y is discrete or the feasible set Fβ ⊂ X × Y is non-convex, so long as we can
still efficiently solve max(x,y)∈Fβ `(θ;x, y). In particular, the min-max attack can search
over different choices of y˜ for each poisoned points (x˜, y˜), whereas the influence and KKT
attacks require us to grid search over the relative proportion of the poisoned points, a
strategy that quickly becomes infeasible in multi-class problems. Indeed, we need k(k − 1)
distinct points to carry out any data poisoning attack against a k-class SVM (Proposition 10
in Appendix A), so the grid search would take time exponential in k2.
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Figure 9: The min-max attack scales to handle multi-class attacks, as it automatically
chooses the class balance / relative proportion of poisoned points. Here, we show
that the min-max attack can increase test error on the MNIST dataset to 13.7%
with  = 3% poisoned data.
We illustrate a multi-class attack by running the min-max attack on the 10-class MNIST
dataset (LeCun et al., 1998). We use the multi-class SVM formulation in Crammer and Singer
(2002) as a classifier and train the model using AdaGrad (Duchi et al., 2010), with a batch
size of 20, step size η = 0.02, and 3 passes over the training data. Using  = 3% poisoned
data, the min-max attack obtains 15.2% test error against the L2 defense and 13.7% test
error against the loss defense, demonstrating a high-leverage attack in a multi-class setting.
Discussion. As the preceding paragraph shows, the min-max attack effectively handles
multi-class problems, whereas the influence and KKT attacks would require an exponential
grid search. (One might be able to adapt the latter attacks to automatically tune the relative
weight of points, but that is a non-trivial extension which we leave for future work.)
The drawback of the min-max attack is that it only works when the test and training
data are drawn from the same distribution, since it uses the training loss as a proxy for the
test loss. In contrast, the influence and KKT do not make any assumptions on the nature
of the test data.
Steinhardt et al. (2017) use the min-max-basic attack to get upper bounds on how
effective any attack can be against the L2 and slab defenses. We discuss this more in the
related work (Section 8).
7. Transferability
In Sections 4-6, we saw that the influence, KKT, and min-max attacks are all effective
on the Enron and IMDB datasets if the attacker knows the exact model that the defender is
using. We summarize the relative merits of these attacks in Table 2.
Our final set of experiments study the question of transferability—are these attacks still
effective when the attacker does not have exact knowledge of the defender, as in often the
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Attack Enron
test error
Time
taken
Pros and cons
Influence 18.3% 286min No need to find θdecoy
Slow
Less transferable
KKT 22.5% 27s θdecoy handles loss defense (but need to find good θdecoy)
Min-max 23.7% 28min θdecoy handles loss defense (but need to find good θdecoy)
Handles multi-class setting
Assumes indiscriminate attack
Table 2: Comparison of attacks. Enron test error is reported at  = 3%, and the time taken
is how long each attack took to reach 17% Enron test error.
case in practice? To model this, we use the same attacks on the Enron dataset as described
in the above sections, but vary the defender’s choice of 1) the amount of regularization, 2)
optimization algorithm, and 3) loss function. This creates a mismatch between what the
attacker thinks the defender is doing and what the defender actually does.
In general, our attacks are still effective under these changes, with the min-max attack
generally being the most robust and the influence attack being the least. However, the
loss defense poses problems for all three attacks when the optimization algorithm or the loss
function are changed, suggesting that attackers should set conservative thresholds against
the loss defense.
7.1 Regularization
Do attacks that are optimized for one level of regularization still work well at other levels of
regularization? Recall that the defender uses L2 regularization with the hyperparameter λ
controlling the amount of regularization (Equation 2); in particular, we use λ = 0.09 for the
Enron dataset (Table 1). To test the effect of the defender’s choice of λ, we varied it from
0.009 to 0.9 while keeping the attacker’s λ constant at 0.09.
Figure 10 shows the results:
• Against the L2 defense, test error generally increased with L2 regularization strength
(Figure 10-Left). Note that the L2 feasible set depends only on the location of the
poisoned points and does not depend on the model parameters that the defender
learns. Thus, the change in test error is due to the defender learning a different set of
parameters given exactly the same set of poisoned points; it is not due to a change in
which poisoned points are being filtered out by the defenses.
• The amount of regularization had different effects on each attack’s effectiveness against
the L2 defense. In particular, the influence attack for a constant attacker regular-
ization became less effective as we reduced defender regularization (< 10% test error
against the L2 defense at λ = 0.009), while the min-max attack was robust to changes
in defender regularization (22% test error at λ = 0.009).
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Figure 10: The effect of changing the defender’s regularization strength on the test error
achieved by each attack. The attacker’s regularization is fixed at λ = 0.09.
• Increasing regularization can make the loss defense more effective (Figure 10-Right).
The loss feasible set is sensitive to changes in the model parameters that the defender
learns, so some poisoned points that evaded this defense under the original model
(with λ = 0.09) are now detected under the changed model.
• Unlike the other attacks, the min-max attack initially gets more effective against
the loss defense as defender regularization is increased from λ = 0.09. We suspect
that this is due to the min-max attack using a fixed loss threshold τ (see equation
(22) in Section 6.2) that is more conservative than the KKT attack (which uses an
adaptive threshold based on the quantiles of the loss under the decoy parameters) and
the influence attack (which solely relies on concentrated attacks to overcome the loss
defense).
These results imply that attackers should optimize for lower levels of regularization, just
in case the defender goes to a lower level (and conversely, it suggests that defenders might
want to use lower levels of regularization than they might otherwise). Attackers using decoy
parameters might also decide to set their loss thresholds more conservatively (i.e., choose
poisoned points that obtain a lower loss under the learned parameters).
These results also suggest that our data poisoning attacks are not exploiting overfitting. If
that were the case, we would expect that increasing regularization would decrease overfitting
and thus reduce the effectiveness of the attacks. Instead, we observe the opposite in practice:
the defender suffers when increasing regularization (although it may be able to filter out
more poisoned points via the loss defense). Intuitively, a larger amount of regularization
makes it harder for the defender’s model to fit both the poisoned training points and clean
training points well, and if the clean training points are not fit well, the test error will
consequently increase.
7.2 Optimization and loss function
In our previous experiments, we assumed that the defender would learn the model param-
eters θˆ that globally minimized training loss. In practice, defenders might use stochastic
optimization and/or early stopping, leading to parameters θˆ that are close to but not exactly
at the optimum.
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Figure 11: With the significant exception of the loss defense, the attack results are robust
to shifts in the optimization algorithm (from an exact solution to a single pass
of stochastic gradient descent) and the loss function (from the hinge loss to the
logistic loss).
Figure 11-Left shows the results of our attacks on a defender that learned a model by
doing a single pass of stochastic gradient descent over the dataset (i.e., each sample is looked
at exactly once). We also tested how an attacker using the hinge loss would fare against
a defender who uses the logistic loss (Figure 11-Right). All three attacks stayed effective
against all of the defenses except the loss defense, which managed to significantly reduce
the damage inflicted by the attacker.
As in Section 7.1, these results suggest that attackers should use a conservative loss
threshold to harden their attacks against loss-based defenses. It also suggests that the
attacker’s ability to evade loss-based defenses is especially sensitive (relative to other
defenses) to getting the defender’s model correct.
8. Related Work
In this section, we discuss other attack settings and defense strategies that have been studied
in the literature. For broad surveys on this topic, see e.g., Barreno et al. (2010), Biggio et al.
(2014), Gardiner and Nagaraja (2016), and Papernot et al. (2016b).
8.1 Attacks
Gradient-based attacks. The influence attack that we presented in Section 4 is a
gradient-based attack that iteratively modifies each attack point (x˜, y˜) ∈ Dp by following the
gradient of the test loss with respect to x˜. This type of gradient-based data poisoning attack
was first studied in the context of SVMs by Biggio et al. (2012), and has subsequently been
extended to linear and logistic regression (Mei and Zhu, 2015b), topic modeling (Mei and
Zhu, 2015a), collaborative filtering (Li et al., 2016), and neural networks (Koh and Liang,
2017; Yang et al., 2017; Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al., 2017).
Label-flip attacks. All of the attacks presented in this work control both the label y˜ and
input features x˜ of the poisoned points. Attacks that instead only control the label y˜ are
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known as label-flip attacks. In a typical label-flip attack, the attacker gets to change some 
fraction of the labels y of the training set but is unable to change the features x (Biggio
et al., 2011; Xiao et al., 2012, 2015). We experimented with a variant of the label flip attack
described in Xiao et al. (2012), where we allowed the attacker to pick examples from the
test set, flip their labels, and add them to the training set (Appendix B). We found that
this attack, though fast to run, was significantly less effective than our proposed attacks;
control of x˜ seems to be necessary to carry out high-leverage attacks in the presence of data
sanitization defenses.
Targeted vs. indiscriminate attacks. In all of our experiments, the attacker sought to
increase error on a test set Dtest that was drawn from the same distribution as the clean
training data Dc. This type of attack is known as an indiscriminate attack (Barreno et al.,
2010), and is akin to a denial-of-service attack.
Indiscriminate attacks seek to change the predictions of the learned model on a good
fraction of the entire data distribution, and therefore require substantial changes to the
model. This makes indiscriminate attacks statistically interesting, as they get at fundamental
properties of the model: how might an attacker that only controls 1% of the training data
bring about a 10% increase in test error?
A different type of attack is a targeted attack, in which the attacker seeks to cause errors
on specific test examples or small sub-populations of test examples (Gu et al., 2017; Chen
et al., 2017; Burkard and Lagesse, 2017; Koh and Liang, 2017; Shafahi et al., 2018; Suciu
et al., 2018). For example, an attacker might seek to have all of the emails that they send
marked as non-spam while leaving other emails unaffected. Targeted attackers only seek to
change the predictions of the model on a small number of instances, and therefore might be
able to add in 50 poisoned training points to cause an error on a single test point (Shafahi
et al., 2018). Targeted attacks are well-motivated from a security perspective: attackers
might only care about a subset of the model’s prediction, and targeted attacks require less
control over the training set and are therefore easier to carry out.
The influence and KKT attacks in Sections 4 and 5 do not make any assumptions on
the nature of the test set Dtest, and can therefore handle the targeted attack setting without
modification. In contrast, the min-max attack in Section 6 assumes that the training error
is a good approximation to the test error, and thus is only appropriate in the indiscriminate
attack setting.
Backdoor attacks. A backdoor attack is a targeted attack that seeks to cause examples
that contain a specific backdoor pattern, e.g., a bright sticker (Gu et al., 2017) or a particular
type of sunglasses (Chen et al., 2017), to be misclassified. Backdoor attacks work by
superimposing the chosen backdoor pattern onto particular training examples from a given
class, which causes the model to associate the backdoor pattern with that class (and therefore
misclassify, at test time, examples of a different class that also contain the backdoor pattern).
The attackers in Gu et al. (2017) and Chen et al. (2017) do not need to know the model
that the defender is using; in fact, the attacker in Chen et al. (2017) does not even need
any knowledge of the training set, instead adding examples from a external dataset. These
weaker assumptions on attacker capabilities are common in targeted attacks. In contrast,
the indiscriminate attacks that we develop in this paper make use of knowledge of the model
and the training set in order to have high leverage.
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Clean-label attacks. Clean-label attacks are attacks that “do not require control over
the labeling function; the poisoned training data appear to be labeled correctly according
to an expert observer” (Shafahi et al., 2018). Not requiring control over labeling makes
it easier for the attacker to practically conduct such an attack, as the attacker only needs
to introduce the unlabeled poisoned data into the general pool of data (e.g., uploading
poisoned images or sending poisoned emails, as Shafahi et al. (2018) discusses) and wait for
the defender to label and ingest the poisoned data.
The backdoor attacks discussed above are examples of clean-label attacks, provided the
backdoor pattern is chosen to be innocuous enough to avoid human suspicion. Another way
of constructing clean-label attacks is by constraining the poisoned points to be close, in
some metric, to a clean training point of the same class; Shafahi et al. (2018) does this with
the `2 norm, while Suciu et al. (2018) and Koh and Liang (2017) use the `∞ norm.
Our attacks are not clean-label attacks, in that the poisoned points will not necessarily
be labeled as the correct class by a human expert. On the other hand, our poisoned points
are designed to evade detection by automatic outlier detectors; note that “clean-label” points
can fool human experts but still look like statistical outliers.
Adversarial examples and test-time attacks. The bulk of recent research in machine
learning security has focused on test-time attacks, where the attacker perturbs the test
example to obtain a desired classification, leaving the training data and the model unchanged.
This line of research was sparked by the striking discovery that test images could be perturbed
in a visually-imperceptible way and yet fool state-of-the-art neural network image classifiers
(Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016;
Papernot et al., 2016a, 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). Designing models that are
robust to such attacks, as well as coming up with more effective attacks, is an active area
of research (Papernot et al., 2016c; Madry et al., 2017; Trame`r et al., 2017; Wong and
Kolter, 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018; Sinha et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018; Papernot
and McDaniel, 2018).
In contrast to these test-time attacks, data poisoning attacks are train-time attacks: the
attacker leaves the test example unchanged, and instead perturbs the training data so as to
affect the learned model. Data poisoning is less well-studied, and compared to test-time
attacks, it is harder to both attack and defend in the data poisoning setting: data poisoning
attacks have to depend on the entire training set, whereas test-time attacks only depend on
the learned parameters; and common defense techniques against test-time attacks, such as
’adversarial training’ (Goodfellow et al., 2015), do not have analogues in the data poisoning
setting.
8.2 Defenses
Less work has been done on how to defend against data poisoning attacks. In the literature,
effective defenses typically require additional information than the defenders we consider in
this paper, e.g., having a labeled set of outliers or having a trusted dataset.
Using labeled outlier data and other training metadata. If the defender has access
to data that has been labeled as ‘normal’ vs. ‘outlier’, then outlier detection can be treated
as a standard supervised classification problem (Hodge and Austin, 2004). For example,
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an online retailer might have a set of transactions that had been previously labeled as
fraudulent, and could train a separate outlier detection model to detect and throw out other
fraudulent-looking transactions from the dataset. One drawback of this method is that in
an adversarial setting there is no assumption that future poisoned points might look like
previous poisoned points. Such methods are therefore more suited for detecting outliers
caused by natural noise processes rather than adversaries.
Instead of directly using ‘normal’ vs. ‘outlier’ labels, defenders can instead rely on other
types of training metadata. For example, Cretu et al. (2008)—which introduced the term
‘data sanitization’ in the context of machine learning— uses information on the time at
which each training point was added to the training set. The intuition is that “in a training
set spanning a sufficiently large time interval, an attack or an abnormality will appear only
in small and relatively confined time intervals” (Cretu et al., 2008).
Using trusted data. Other defense methods rely on having a trusted subset T of the
training data that only contains clean data (obtained for example by human curation). One
example is the Reject on Negative Impact (RONI) defense proposed by Nelson et al. (2008),
which was one of the first papers studying data poisoning attacks and defenses. The RONI
defense iterates over training points (x, y) and rejects points if the model learned on just the
trusted data T is significantly different from the model learned on T ∪ {(x, y)}. Another
example is the outlier detector introduced in Paudice et al. (2018), which operates similarly
to our k-NN defense except that it measures distances only to the points in the trusted
subset.
Having a trusted dataset makes it easier for the defender, though such a dataset might
be expensive or even impossible to collect; if the defender has enough resources to collect a
large amount of trusted data, then they can train a model on only the trusted data, solving
the problem of data poisoning. The question of whether a small amount of trusted data
is sufficient for defeating attackers while maintaining high overall performance (i.e., not
rejecting clean training points that are not similar to the trusted data) is an open one.
Finally, defenses that rely on trusted data are particularly vulnerable to attackers that
manage to compromise the trusted data (e.g., through clean-label attacks that escape human
notice).
High-dimensional robust estimation. Recent work in the theoretical computer science
community studies robust estimators in high dimensions, which seek to work well even in
the presence of outliers. A key issue is that many traditional robust estimators incur a
√
d
increase in error in d dimensions. This theoretical insight aligns with the empirical results
in this paper showing that it is often possible to attack classifiers with only a small fraction
of poisoned data.
Motivated by these issues, Klivans et al. (2009) and later Awasthi et al. (2014) and
Diakonikolas et al. (2017b) design robust classification algorithms that avoid the poor
dimension-dependence of traditional estimators, although only under strong distributional
assumptions such as log-concavity. Separately, Lai et al. (2016) and Diakonikolas et al. (2016)
designed robust procedures for mean estimation, which again required strong distributional
assumptions. Later work (Charikar et al., 2017; Diakonikolas et al., 2017a; Steinhardt et al.,
2018) showed how to perform mean estimation under much more mild assumptions, and
Diakonikolas et al. (2017a) showed that their procedure could yield robust estimates in
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practice. In recent concurrent work, Diakonikolas et al. (2018) showed that robust estimation
techniques can be adapted to classification and used this to design a practical algorithm
that appears more robust than many traditional alternatives. It would be interesting future
work to attack this latter algorithm in order to better vet its robustness.
Certified defenses. Steinhardt et al. (2017) explore the task of provably certifying
defenses, i.e., computing a dataset-dependent upper bound on the maximum test loss that
an attacker can cause the defender to incur. Their method—from which we adopt the
min-max-basic attack, in the present work—shows that the L2 and slab defenses are
sufficient for defending models trained on the MNIST-1-7 and Dogfish datasets but cannot
certifiably protect models trained on the Enron and IMDB datasets, which matches with
the experimental results in Sections 4-6. Open questions are whether our improvements
to the min-max-basic (e.g., decoy parameters) can be used in their framework to derive
tighter upper bounds on attack effectiveness, and whether the other defenses (e.g., the loss
defense) can be incorporated into their framework.
9. Discussion
Data poisoning attacks pose risks to machine learning systems deployed in the real world.
To better understand our vulnerabilities and ability to defend against these attacks, we
systematically studied how data poisoning attacks fare against a broad range of data
sanitization defenses.
We were able to develop three distinct attacks that could evade data sanitization defenses
while significantly increasing test error on the Enron and IMDB datasets. The influence
attack directly optimizes for increasing the test loss through gradient ascent on the poisoned
points; the KKT attack chooses poisoned points to achieve pre-determined decoy parameters;
and the min-max attack efficiently solves for the poisoned points that maximize train loss,
as a proxy for test loss. Compared to previous data poisoning attacks, e.g., the gradient-
based attacks in Biggio et al. (2012), Mei and Zhu (2015b), and Koh and Liang (2017); the
min-max attack in Steinhardt et al. (2017); or the label flip attacks in Xiao et al. (2012)
(described in Section 8 and Appendix B), our attacks significantly increase test error even in
the presence of data sanitization defenses.
Our conclusion is that simple data sanitization defenses fail. We need to develop better
defenses to effectively counter data poisoning attacks, and as our results above show, these
defenses need to be tested against attackers that are specifically geared to evade them. We
end by highlighting future directions of study arising from our work.
What makes datasets and models attackable? The effectiveness of our attacks vary
significantly from dataset to dataset (e.g., linear models trained on the Enron and IMDB
datasets are more vulnerable than linear models trained on the MNIST-1-7 and Dogfish
datasets). What conditions make certain models on certain datasets attackable, but not
others? This is an open question; we speculate that linear models on the Enron and IMDB
datasets are easier to attack because they have higher dimensionality and are less linearly
separable, but this question deserves more study.
Non-convex models. One limitation of our attacks is that they rely on the attacker and
defender being able to find the model parameters θ that globally minimize the training loss.
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This is a reasonable assumption if the loss is convex, but most models in practice today (e.g.,
neural networks) are non-convex. Analysis of attack algorithms in the non-convex setting is
substantially more difficult, e.g., a poisoning attack that works against a neural net trained
with a given random seed might fail when the random seed is changed, or a single poisoned
point might cause the defender to get stuck at a very bad local minimum. The targeted
attack algorithms discussed in Section 8 (Gu et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Shafahi et al.,
2018; Suciu et al., 2018) circumvent this difficulty by adding poisoned points that resemble
the test point but have a different label, at the cost of lower leverage. Open questions
include whether our attacks, which change the global minimizer, remain effective in the
non-convex setting, and whether the methods used for targeted attacks can be adapted to
design high-leverage indiscriminate attacks against non-convex models.
Strategies for stronger defenses. What prospects are there for building stronger de-
fenses that are robust against determined attackers? We outline several approaches, as well
as potential difficulties.
One strategy would be to try to design better outlier detectors—perhaps the L2 and
slab defenses provide too crude a measure of whether a point is realistic, and sophisticated
generative models such as generative adversarial nets (Goodfellow et al., 2014) could
better rule out poisoned data. We are skeptical of this approach, as there are many
natural distributions (such as multivariate Gaussians) where even a perfect generative model
cannot prevent an adversary from substantially skewing empirical statistics of the data
(see Steinhardt (2018), Section 1.3). The existence of adversarial test examples for image
classifiers (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015) also weights against this approach,
since such examples are generated using a method for inducing high loss under a target
model. This method could likely be adapted for use in the min-max attack, as the the
main sub-routine in that attack involves generating examples that induce high loss under a
target model.
Another strategy rests on the observation that if we could directly minimize the 0− 1
test error (rather than using a convex proxy), then an adversary controlling an -fraction
of the data could always induce at most additional 1− error, at least on the training set.
4
The key issue with convex proxies for the 0/1-loss is that they are unbounded and so an
adversary can cause the loss on Dp to be very large. Perhaps one can do better by instead
using non-convex but bounded proxies for the 0/1-loss? This would make optimization of the
training loss more difficult, but might pay off with higher robustness. It unfortunately also
opens up a new avenue for attack—the attacker could try to push the learner towards a bad
local minimum. There are also known hardness results for even approximately minimizing
the 0/1-loss (Feldman et al., 2009; Guruswami and Raghavendra, 2009), but it is possible
that they do not apply in practice.
Finally, as noted in Section 8, there is recent work seeking to design estimators that
are provably robust to adversarial training data under suitable distributional assumptions.
Diakonikolas et al. (2018) recently presented a practical implementation of these methods
for classification and regression tasks and showed promising initial results. We view provable
security under a well-defined threat model as the gold standard, and encourage further
4. To see this, note that the 0/1-loss of θ∗ averaged across Dc ∪ Dp is at most at most  larger than across
Dc, so any θˆ outperforming θ∗ can only have slightly higher loss than θˆ across Dc.
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work along this direction (we refer the interested reader to Li (2018) or Steinhardt (2018)
for two recent overviews). There appears to be plenty of room both to improve the
practical implementation of this family of defenses, and to devise new theoretically-grounded
procedures.
Reproducibility
The code and data for replicating our experiments are available on GitHub (https://
github.com/kohpangwei/data-poisoning-journal-release).
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Appendix A. How many distinct points are needed for data poisoning
attacks?
Consider some attack Dp which makes a defender learn model parameters θˆ. Under what
conditions does there exist some other attack D′p that contains at most as many points
(|Dp| ≥ |D′p|), but with fewer distinct points (i.e., D′p contains repeated copies of points)?
If the attacker could place poisoned points at arbitrary locations, and if the model’s loss
function is unbounded (as is the case in most models, e.g., SVMs or logistic regression),
then very few poisoned points (distinct or otherwise) are generally needed since the attacker
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can get high leverage over the model by placing a poisoned point far away. However, in our
setting, the attacker is constrained to play poisoned points that are in the feasible set F .
In this section, we provide a general method for finding the minimum number of distinct
points necessary for achieving any attack, given a model with a strictly convex loss function
and some feasible set F . We show that for binary SVMs and logistic regression, if F is
convex for each class—as is the case for the L2, slab, loss, and SVD—then only 2 distinct
points are necessary.
As a high-level sketch, our proof proceeds as follows:
1. (Proposition 4) We consider the set of scaled feasible gradients Gθˆ
def
= {α∇θ`(θˆ;x, y) :
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (x, y) ∈ F}. This set corresponds to the gradients of all feasible points,
scaled by some 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We show that the number of distinct points needed for an
attack relates to the geometry of this set Gθˆ. In particular, if Gθˆ is convex for each
class, then only 2 points are needed.
2. (Proposition 7) We check that for SVMs, Gθˆ is convex for each class if the original
feasible set F is convex for each class.
3. (Proposition 8) More generally, we establish conditions under which differentiable
margin-based losses have Gθˆ convex for each class, and we show that logistic regression
satisfies these conditions.
For convenience, in the sequel we will assume that these models are trained by finding
θˆ = arg min
θ∈Θ
λ
2
‖θ‖22 +
∑
(x,y)∈Dc
`(θ;x, y) +
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈Dp
`(θ; x˜, y˜). (23)
In other words, the degree of regularization is not explicitly affected by the total number of
data points |Dc|+ |Dp|. Moreover, the overall loss is strictly convex due to regularization,
even if `(θ;x, y) is only convex (and not strictly convex) in θ, as is the case with the hinge
loss. We also assume that Dp ⊆ F (otherwise, the poisoned points will simply be thrown
out by the defender).
We start by establishing the equivalence between the number of distinct points needed
to poison a given model and the geometry of the set of feasible gradients of that model.
Definition 3 The Carathe´odory number of a set G ⊆ Rn is the smallest number c such that
each g˜ ∈ conv(G) can be written as a convex combination of at most c points in G. (Each g˜
may be a convex combination of a different set of c points.)
Proposition 4 Consider a defender who learns a model by first discarding all points outside
a fixed feasible set F , and then finding the parameters that minimize a strictly convex loss
`(θ;x, y) averaged over the training set. If a parameter θˆ is attainable by any set of n˜
poisoned points Dp = {(x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜n˜, y˜n˜)} ⊆ F , then there exists a set D˜p that also
attains θˆ with at most n˜ poisoned points but only contains c distinct points (with a potentially
fractional number of repeats of each point), where c is the Carathe´odory number of the set of
possible scaled gradients Gθˆ
def
= {α∇θ`(θˆ;x, y) : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (x, y) ∈ F}.
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Remark 5 If `(θ;x, y) is not differentiable in θ, we obtain an equivalent result by con-
sidering the subgradient sets ∂θ`. In this case, we can define Gθˆ
def
= {αg : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, g ∈⋃
(x,y)∈F ∂θ`(θˆ;x, y)}. For clarity in the following proof, we will assume that `(θ;x, y) is
differentiable, but the argument for the non-differentiable case is almost identical.
Proof Assume that we are given a set of n clean training points Dc and a set of n˜ poisoned
points Dp. Without loss of generality, we assume that each poisoned point (x˜, y˜) ∈ Dp lies
in the feasible set F (otherwise, the poisoned point will be filtered out and have no effect).
The defender learns parameters θˆ that minimize the training loss
λ
2
‖θ‖22 +
∑
(x,y)∈Dc
`(θ;x, y) +
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈Dp
`(θ; x˜, y˜). (24)
Since θˆ is a minimum of the loss, we have that
0 = λθˆ +
∑
(x,y)∈Dc
∇θ`(θˆ;x, y) +
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈Dp
∇θ`(θˆ; x˜, y˜), (25)
where ∇θ`(θˆ;x, y) denotes the gradient of the loss at the point (x, y) with parameters θˆ.
Our goal is to find the minimum number of distinct points c such that given any
clean dataset Dc, attack Dp, and consequent model parameters θˆ, we can find some other
attack D˜p with at most c distinct points such that D˜p also makes the defender learn θˆ.
The key observation is that because the loss is strictly convex (by assumption), (25) is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the defender to learn θˆ. In particular, if we define g
def
=∑
(x˜,y˜)∈Dp ∇θ`(θˆ; x˜, y˜), then any other attack D˜p that satisfies g =
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈D˜p ∇θ`(θˆ; x˜, y˜)—
note that we have D˜p in place of Dp— will also make the defender learn θˆ.
What values can g take on? Since g
def
=
∑
(x˜,y˜)∈Dp ∇θ`(θˆ; x˜, y˜) by construction, and each
point (x˜, y˜) in Dp lies in the feasible set F , we know that the normalized vector g˜ def= g/n˜
(where n˜ is the number of points in D˜p) is contained in the convex hull conv(Gθˆ), where Gθˆ
is the set of scaled gradients that are possible in the feasible set, Gθˆ
def
= {α∇θ`(θˆ;x, y) : 0 ≤
α ≤ 1, (x, y) ∈ F}.5
Now, say we can find c points g1, g2, . . . , gc ∈ Gθˆ such that g˜ is a convex combination of
these points (i.e., g˜ ∈ γ1g1 + γ2g2 + . . .+ γkgc, with γi ≥ 0 and
∑
i γi = 1). Since each point
gi ∈ Gθˆ can be written as αi∇θ`(θˆ; x˜i, y˜i) for some (x˜i, y˜i) ∈ F with 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, we can
construct a dataset D˜p comprising α1γ1n˜ copies of (x˜1, y˜1), α2γ2n˜ copies of (x˜2, y˜2), and so
on, such that g = n˜g˜ = n˜
∑c
i=1 αiγi∇θ`(θˆ; x˜i, y˜i). This constructed dataset D˜p will therefore
attain θˆ with only c distinct points, and since
∑c
i=1 αiγi ≤ 1, the total weight of all of these
points will be less than or equal to n˜.
We thus want to find the smallest number c such that for any g˜ ∈ conv(Gθˆ), we can
write g˜ as a convex combination of at most c points in Gθˆ. This is the definition of the
Carathe´odory number of Gθˆ, as desired.
5. g is actually contained in the convex hull of the unscaled gradient set {∇θ`(θˆ;x, y) : (x, y) ∈ F}, which
is a subset of the scaled gradient set, so the above proof also goes through if we consider the unscaled
gradient set in place of the scaled gradient set. However, as we will see later in this section, adding the α
scaling term reduces the Carathe´odory number, which gives a stronger result.
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Proposition 4 tells us that to find the number of distinct points required for data poisoning
attacks on a given model and feasible set, it suffices to find the Carathe´odory number of
the set of feasible gradients of that model. Finding the Carathe´odory number of a set is a
well-studied problem (see, e.g., Ba´ra´ny and Karasev (2012), or Mirrokni et al. (2015) for an
approximate version of the problem). In our setting, each feasible set can be written as the
union of a small number of convex sets, which simplifies the analysis of its Carathe´odory
number. We start by establishing the following lemma:
Lemma 6 If a set G is the union of k convex sets, G = G1 ∪ G2 ∪ . . .Gk where each Gi is
convex, then the Carathe´odory number of G is at most k.
Proof Pick any g˜ ∈ conv(G). By construction, we can write g˜ = ∑ki=1∑nij=1 αijxij where
xij ∈ Gi, αij ≥ 0, and
∑
i
∑
j αij = 1. Since the Gi are convex sets, we can find x˜i ∈ Gi ⊆ G
such that x˜i =
∑ni
j=1 αijxij/
∑ni
j=1 αij , allowing us to write g˜ =
∑k
i=1
(∑ni
j=1 αij
)
x˜i. Since
any g˜ ∈ conv(G) can be written as the convex combination of at most k points in G, the
Carathe´odory number of G is k.
We use this lemma to establish the Carathe´odory number of the set of scaled gradients
for a binary SVM.
Proposition 7 (Carathe´odory number of G for a 2-class SVM) Consider the setting
of Proposition 4, and let the loss function be the `2-regularized hinge loss on data with binary
labels. Suppose that for each class y = −1,+1, the feasible set Fy def= {x : (x, y) ∈ F} is a con-
vex set. Then the Carathe´odory number of Gθˆ
def
= {αg : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, g ∈ ⋃(x,y)∈F ∂θ`(θˆ;x, y)}
is at most 2, independent of θˆ.
Proof Recall that in a binary SVM, the loss on an individual point is given by
`(θ;x, y) = max(0, 1− yθ>x). (26)
For convenience, we have folded the regularization term into the loss on each point.
From Proposition 4, we want to find the Carathe´odory number of the set of all possible
scaled (sub)gradients of poisoned points G def= {αg : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, g ∈ ⋃(x,y)∈F ∂θ`(θˆ;x, y)}.
For a binary SVM, the subgradient sets are:
∂θ`(θˆ;x, y) =

{0}, if yθˆ>x > 1
{−γyx : 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1} if yθˆ>x = 1
{−yx} if yθˆ>x < 1.
(27)
Plugging this into the expression for Gθˆ, we get that
Gθˆ = {−αyx : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (x, y) ∈ F , yθˆ>x ≤ 1}, (28)
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which we can rewrite as the union of two convex sets, one for each class:
Gθˆ = {−αx : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (x,+1) ∈ F+1, θˆ>x ≤ 1} ∪ {αx : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (x,−1) ∈ F−1,−θˆ>x ≤ 1}.
By Lemma 6, the Carathe´odory number of Gθˆ is at most 2, regardless of what θˆ is.
More generally, we can bound the Carathe´odory number of the set of scaled gradients
for a particular class of convex, differentiable, margin-based losses.
Proposition 8 (Carathe´odory number of G for margin-based losses) Consider the
setting of Proposition 4 on binary data, and let the loss function be `(θ;x, y) = c(−yθ>x),
where c : R→ R is a convex, monotone increasing, and twice-differentiable function. Suppose
that the ratio of the second to the first derivative of c, c′′/c′ is a monotone non-increasing
function, and that for each class y = −1,+1, the feasible set Fy def= {x : (x, y) ∈ F} is a
convex set. Then the Carathe´odory number of Gθˆ
def
= {α∇θ`(θˆ;x, y) : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (x, y) ∈ F}
is at most 2, independent of θˆ.
Proof We can write Gθˆ as the union of two sets Gθˆ,+1 and Gθˆ,−1, one for each class, where
Gθˆ,y
def
= {α∇θ`(θˆ;x, y) : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, x ∈ Fy}. To show that the Carathe´odory number of Gθˆ is
at most 2, it suffices to show that each class set Gθˆ,y is convex and then apply Lemma 6.
Pick θˆ arbitrarily and fix y to be −1 or +1. To check that Gθˆ,y is convex, it suffices to
check that for each possible choice of x1 and x2 in Fy and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, there exists some
x˜ ∈ Fy and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 such that
α∇θ`(θˆ; x˜, y) = γ∇θ`(θˆ;x1, y) + (1− γ)∇θ`(θˆ;x2, y). (29)
Since our loss function has the form `(θ;x, y) = c(−yθ>x), we have that
∇θ`(θˆ;x, y) = c′(−yθ>x)(−yx), (30)
where c′ is the derivative of c. Substituting this into (29) and cancelling out the −y terms
on both sides gives us the equivalent condition
αc′(−yθ>x˜)x˜ = γc′(−yθ>x1)x1 + (1− γ)c′(−yθ>x2)x2. (31)
To satisfy the above condition, we will take
x˜ =
γc′(−yθ>x1)
γc′(−yθ>x1) + (1− γ)c′(−yθ>x2)x1 +
(1− γ)c′(−yθ>x2)
γc′(−yθ>x1) + (1− γ)c′(−yθ>x2)x2, (32)
which in turn implies that
α =
γc′(−yθ>x1) + (1− γ)c′(−yθ>x2)
c′(−yθ>x˜) . (33)
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Since x˜ is a convex combination of x1 and x2, the convexity of Fy implies that x˜ ∈ Fy, so it
remains to check that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.6 Moreover, since c is monotone increasing by assumption,
c′ is positive, and therefore α is positive. It remains to check that α ≤ 1.
First, note that log c′(·) is a concave function, as its derivative c′′/c′ is monotone non-
increasing by assumption. For notational convenience, let s1
def
= −yθ>x1 and s2 def= −yθ>x2,
and let T
def
= γc′(s1) + (1− γ)c′(s2). We then have that
log c′(−yθ>x˜) = log c′
(
γc′(s1)s1 + (1− γ)c′(s2)s2
T
)
≥ (γc′(s1)/T ) log c′(s1) + ((1− γ)c′(s2)/T ) log c′(s2) (Jensen’s)
= (γc′(s1)/T ) log
γc′(s1)/T
γ
+ ((1− γ)c′(s2)/T ) log (1− γ)c
′(s2)/T
γ
+ log T
≥ log T (non-negativity of KL divergence)
Exponentiating both sides and rearranging gives us
α =
T
c′(−yθ>x˜) ≤ 1.
The above argument shows that Gθˆ,y is a convex set. Since we picked θˆ and y arbitrarily,
we can apply Lemma 6 to conclude that Gθˆ = Gθˆ,+1 ∪ Gθˆ,−1 has Carathe´odory number at
most 2 regardless of θˆ.
Corollary 9 (Carathe´odory number of G for logistic regression) Consider a logis-
tic regression model in the setting of Proposition 8, where `(θ;x, y) = log(1 + exp(−yθ>x)).
Then the Carathe´odory number of Gθˆ
def
= {α∇θ`(θˆ;x, y) : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (x, y) ∈ F} is at most 2,
independent of θˆ.
Proof In logistic regression, we have that c(v) = log(1 + exp(v)); c′(v) = σ(v) where
σ is the sigmoid function, σ(v)
def
= 11+exp(−v) ; and c
′′(v) = σ(v)(1 − σ(v)). Thus, c′′c′ is a
monotone decreasing function, and c is convex, monotone increasing, and twice-differentiable,
so Proposition 8 applies.
We can collect all of the above results into the following theorem, which appears in the
main text.
Theorem 1 (2 points suffice for 2-class SVMs and logistic regression) Consider a
defender who learns a 2-class SVM or logistic regression model by first discarding all points
outside a fixed feasible set F , and then finding the parameters that minimize the aver-
age (regularized) training loss. Suppose that for each class y = −1,+1, the feasible set
6. Note that since αc′(−yθ>x˜) is a scalar, so for (31) to hold, x˜ needs to point in the same direction as
γc′(−yθ>x1)x1 + (1− γ)c′(−yθ>x2)x2. Moreover, since we need x˜ to be in Fy, we want x˜ to be a convex
combination of x1 and x2. This choice of x˜ is the only choice that satisfies these two considerations.
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Fy def= {x : (x, y) ∈ F} is a convex set. If a parameter θˆ is attainable by any set of n˜ poisoned
points Dp = {(x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜n˜, y˜n˜)} ⊆ F , then there exists a set of at most n˜ poisoned points
D˜p (possibly with fractional copies) that also attains θˆ but only contains 2 distinct points,
one from each class.
More generally, the above statement is true for any margin-based model with loss of
the form `(θ;x, y) = c(−yθ>x), where c : R → R is a convex, monotone increasing, and
twice-differentiable function, and the ratio of second to first derivatives c′′/c′ is monotone
non-increasing.
Proof From Proposition 7 (SVMs), Proposition 8 (margin-based losses), and Corollary 9
(logistic regression), we have that the Carathe´odory number of Gθˆ (the set of scaled possible
gradients) for each of these models is at most 2, regardless of θˆ. By Proposition 4, we
conclude that only 2 distinct points are necessary. In particular, since Gθˆ can be represented
in each of these cases as the union of two convex sets, one for each class, we need 1 distinct
point from each class to realize any data poisoning attack.
The general approach of finding the Carathe´odory number of the set of scaled possible
gradient can be applied to other models beyond those that we consider in this paper. As
one example, we can extend the above approach to the setting of a multi-class SVM:
Proposition 10 (k(k − 1) distinct points suffice for a k-class SVM) Consider the set-
ting of Proposition 7, but with a k-class SVM.
If a parameter θˆ is attainable by any set of n˜ poisoned points Dp = {(x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜n˜, y˜n˜)} ⊆ F ,
then there exists a set of at most n˜ poisoned points D˜p that also attains θˆ, but that only has
k − 1 distinct values of x˜ for each distinct y˜, for a total of k(k − 1) distinct points.
Proof We follow the multi-class SVM formulation described in Crammer and Singer (2002),
which has parameters θ = [θ1; θ2; . . . ; θk] ∈ Rkd for each class y = 1, 2, . . . , k, where d is the
dimensionality of the feature space X . The loss on an individual point is given by
`(θ;x, y) = max(0, 1− θ>y x+ max
i 6=y
θ>i x). (34)
This reduces to the above formulation for a binary (2-class) SVM by setting θ−1 = −θ+1.
Let ix,y = arg maxi 6=y θ>i x, and let x
(i) = [ 0, . . . , 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i−1)d zeroes
x, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−i)d zeroes
]. Without loss of
generality, we can ignore subgradients and take ∇θ`(θ;x, y) = −x(y) + x(ix,y), following a
similar argument to that used in Proposition 7.
Define Gi,j = {−αx(i) +αx(j) : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (x, i) ∈ F}. We have that Gθˆ =
⋃k
i=1
⋃k
j 6=i Gi,j ,
and since each Gi,j is a convex set, by Lemma 6, the Carathe´odory number of G is at most
k(k − 1).
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Appendix B. Label Flip Attacks
Label flip attacks are a popular strategy in the literature for executing data poisoning attacks
(Biggio et al., 2011; Xiao et al., 2012, 2015). In a label flip attack, the attacker is given a set
of real data Dpool = {(x˜i, y˜i)}npooli=1 . To form the poisoned data Dp, the attacker chooses n
points (possibly repeated) from Dpool and flips their labels.
Many ways of choosing which points to flip have been proposed (see Xiao et al. (2015)
for a review). Here, we consider the alfa attack from Xiao et al. (2012). alfa seeks to add
points that have a high loss under the original (clean) model θ∗ def= argminθ L(θ;Dc) but a
low loss under the final (poisoned) model θˆ
def
= argminθ L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp). Concretely, it solves:
maximize
Dp
L(θˆ;Dp)− L(θ∗;Dp)
s.t. |Dp| = |Dc|
(x˜,−y˜) ∈ Dpool ∀(x˜, y˜) ∈ Dp
θˆ = argmin
θ
L(θ;Dc ∪ Dp)
We adapt the original alfa attack to our setting in the following two ways:
1. We constrain all poisoned points in Dp to lie in the feasible set Fβ.
2. We set Dpool = Dtest; that is, the attacker gets to add points from the flipped test
set. Intuitively, adding flipped versions of test points to the training set should cause
the model to wrongly classify those test points, in line with the attacker’s goal of
increasing the model’s loss on the test set.
We evaluated this variant of alfa on the Enron dataset. To make it easier for the attacker,
we only considered the L2 defense. Our implementation of the alfa attack was not able
to increase the test error much, achieving a 2% increase in test error with  = 3%. In
contrast, the attacks we introduce in the main text achieve an increase in test error of 15%
to 20%, despite having to deal with more sophisticated defenses. Our conclusion is that
only modifying the labels y˜, as in label flip attacks, does not give the attacker much power
relative to being able to modify x˜ as well.
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Figure 12: Results of the alfa attack on the Enron dataset and L2 defense.
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